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ABSTRACT 
Distributed/Denial of Service (D/DoS) attacks are the most common and easy-to-
launch attacks against a computer or network. Once a D/DoS attack is recognized, there 
are several methods available to mitigate its impact. One of the methods is to drop the 
attacker's traffic at the edge of the network via Null Routing-also called Black Hole 
Routing (BHR). BHR is more efficient than the creation and processing of access control 
lists. Prior work has validated the effectiveness of BHR in mitigating D/DoS attacks in a 
setting where the defense is activated manually. This research built upon that work and  
developed a proof-of-concept automated BHR process integrated with Snort, an open 
source Intrusion Detection System (IDS), to facilitate a faster reaction to a D/DoS attack. 
A real test bed consisting of Cisco routers was created to evaluate the performance of the 
developed system. The results demonstrated that the automation of BHR is both possible 
and desirable in mitigating D/DoS attacks.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The research in this thesis extends the research done by Nikolaos Stamatelatos, in 
which he stress-tested three implementations of the black hole routing (BHR) concept in 
a lab environment.1 In the “Future Work” section of Mr. Stamatelatos’ research, he 
indicated: 
As noted previously in this study, we assumed that a given DDoS attack 
had been positively identified by either an automated system or a human 
operator. The ability to automatically identify an attack using an IDS/IPS 
system would greatly improve the performance of BGP Black Hole 
Routing. As the research in this field to date is limited, it is our first 
suggested area for future work. 
Thus, the work of this thesis set about not only selecting and configuring an 
appropriate IDS to detect a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack; but to also 
integrate this detection capability into an enhanced BHR system, by having the IDS 
directly cue the “trigger router” that sends the null—black hole—route update to all 
border routers. The result is a working implementation of a fully automated attack-detect-
react-protect BHR system.  
Chapter I introduces the underlying concepts of denial of service (DoS), and 
DDoS attacks. Since the BHR protective mechanism can be used to defend against either 
of these, the collective abbreviation D/DoS will be used henceforth to indicate either the 
single-source (DoS) or multiple-source (DDoS) form of attack.  
Chapter II reviews the three methods of null route association (i.e., by source, by 
destination, and by customer) as described by Stamatelos.2 This review not only helps the 
reader to understand BHR, but is also pivotal to understanding why the by destination 
method was chosen for the automated “alerter” enhancement.  
Chapter III describes the Systems Engineering approach that was taken while 
researching and developing the automated BHR implementation.  
                                                 
1 Nikolaos Stamatelatos, “A Measurement Study of BGP Black Hole Routing Performance,” Master's 
Thesis, September 2006. 
2 Ibid. 
 2
Chapter IV details how the IDS was chosen, configured, and evaluated. 
Finally, Chapter V provides a summary and suggests additional BHR-related 
research.  
A. DISTRIBUTED/DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS 
DoS attacks include any intentional, malicious means by which the legitimate 
consumers of information are denied (or adversely delayed) access to needed 
information. Typical methods of DoS include either the outright destruction (i.e., “hard 
kill”) of the information or systems that store, transmit, or process the information; or the 
overwhelming (i.e., “soft kill”) of system resources that are employed to store, transmit, 
or process the information. DoS attacks, as distinguished from DDoS attacks, are 
executed from a single source. DDoS attacks amplify the effect of a DoS attack by having 
the underlying malicious actions executed/launched from many sources.  
Figure 1 provides example illustrations of both a DoS and a DDoS attack. Also 
illustrated is a slightly modified DDoS that employs “reflectors.” Unlike “slave” systems 
that are non-complicit in the attack but have nonetheless been infected/compromised via 
the installation/introduction of remote-controlled code, “reflector” systems are being used 
“normally.” For example, a “slave” may have Trojan software installed that “listens” on 
port 34,565 for specially formatted commands from the “master” system and then acts on 
those commands. A “reflector,” on the other hand, will be any system that is behaving as 
per normal protocols; however, the manner in which the protocols are being used serves 
to adversely affect the target system. For example, the “master” may send a message to 
its “slaves” to ping attack 192.168.10.35 at 1015EDT on 26 September.  The “slaves” 
will wait until the prescribed date and time, then spoof the target machine’s Internet 
protocol (IP) address and send hundreds of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
echo requests (pings) to a list of known/suspected “reflector” systems. The “reflectors,” 
in turn, echo-reply (normal behavior) to the legitimate owner of the IP address (the 
target), and thus degrade/overwhelm not only the target, but possibly the network(s) the 
target host is attached to as well.  
 3
 
Figure 1.  (A) DoS attack, (B) DDOS attack, (C) DRDOS (Distributed Reflection 
Denial Of Service) or DDOS with Reflectors.3 
B. BLACK HOLE ROUTING 
Black hole routing is a clever way of saying “route this packet to the trash.”  The 
concept is quite simple and leverages the basic operation of routers. Routers inspect 
received packets to identify the destination network (or host, if the destination network is 
directly attached), then consult their routing table  to see if there is either a specific next 
hop for the that network or, as an alternative, a default next hop to reach that network. 
This route table also called a router’s Forward Information Base (FIB), is populated both 
by manual static route configuration and by the automated sharing of information via 
dynamic routing protocols.  
A black hole route tells the router to send the subject packet to the null0 interface 
(a non-existent interface), which is equivalent to telling the router to “route this packet to 
the trash.” As will be discussed in Chapter II, this “route to the trash” idea can cue off of 
                                                 
3 Yanet Manzano, “Tracing the Development of Denial of Service Attacks: A Corporate Analogy,” 
ACM Student Magazine, www.acm.org/crossroads/xrds10-1/tracingDOS.html, last accessed 7 July 2007. 
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a specific sender (source IP address), or a specific destination (destination IP address). 
Figure 2. offers a simplistic model that suggests the immediate network relief that would 
be realized if any/all of several key routers ( i.e., those directly facing zombies) were told 
to “black hole” any packets going to the victim IP address (i.e., destination-based BHR). 
In general practice, the “key” routers will be those positioned at the border of the victim’s 
autonomous system (AS). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Distributed zombie traffic aggregation.4 
C. ADVANTAGES OF BHR 
Undoubtedly, automating BHR has substantial advantages. Prior to the discussion 
of automation and its advantages, it is essential to know the following characteristics of 
BHR, which makes our argument to automate the BHR process stronger. 
In networking, the Access Control List (ACL) is the list of rules which decides 
the treatment to be given to incoming/outgoing packets. An ACL is a method by which 
                                                 
4 Steve Gibson, “Distributed Reflection Denial of Service,” Gibson Research Corporation, 
www.grc.com/dos/drdos.htm, last accessed 7 July 2007. 
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packets can be dropped/forwarded for the inbound/outbound traffic depending upon the 
rules. An ACL is required to be configured on the device where the filtering of packets is 
desired. In network security fields, routers, servers, individual hosts, etc., can have an 
ACL. Although ACLs are effective, they are costlier than BHR in terms of processing. 
During a D/DoS attack, when thousands of packets are flooded towards the victim 
machine, processing an ACL can consume central processing unit (CPU) resources. 
Unlike an ACL, the processing power required to implement null routing is minimal 
because  typically routing table lookup is assisted by special hardware.5  
Figure 3 illustrates the advantages of null routing vis-à-vis ACL. This figure also 
portrays that packets destined for the null route are directly thrown to the “bit-bucket.”; 
i.e., they are discarded. 
A second advantage is that a single entry can be used to control access to both 
inbound and outbound packets. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Advantage of the BHR/Null0 interface.6 
                                                 
5 Nanog, The North American Network Operators' Group, www.nanog.org/mtg-0110/ppt/greene.ppt, 
last accessed 8 July 2007. 
6 Ibid. 
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The third advantage is that a null route can be redistributed via routing protocols 
such as BGP and, as such often only a single black hole route needs to be entered on a 
router. This advantage is elaborated in detail in Appendix A. 
D. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
There have been a couple of studies carried out that talk about the analysis of 
BHR. The first is M. Kleffman’s thesis, “Analysis of Effects of BGP Black Hole Routing on a 
Network like the NIPRNET,” and a second study carried out by N. Stamatelatos in his 
thesis, “A Measurement Study of BGP Blackhole Routing Performance.”  
Kleffman used simulation as the evaluation technique for his research. A 
simulation software package, Opnet Modeler version 10.5, was used by Kleffman to 
perform analysis. The performance metrics chosen by Kleffman was queuing delay, 
latency, router convergence delay, and bandwidth utilization.   
Stamatelatos, on the other hand, used a real test-bed network to evaluate the 
effectiveness of various methods of BHR. The performance metric chosen by 
Stamatelatos was router response time, router CPU load, and link load. The following 
sub-sections briefly discuss the network setup followed for both previous researches.   
1. Lab Setup/Test Bed 
a. Lab Setup in Kleffman’s Research 
As stated earlier in this section, the evaluation method followed by 
Kleffman was simulation. Kleffman simulated 39 experiments, which were replicated 
five times. His simulated network consisted of six border routers, a trigger router, and 
twelve customer routers. He collected and analyzed the data under different workloads 






• To check the effectiveness of BHR in defending the nonsecure Internet 
Protocol Router Netowrk (NIPRNet) against DDOS attacks. 
• To check the effectiveness of BHR without all the border routers 
participating. 
• To study the comparison of remote-triggered versus customer-triggered 
BHR. 
b. Lab Setup in Sramatelos’ Research 
Stamatelatos evaluated the performance of BHR methods in the lab with 
three real-time test-bed networks. He selected seven routers to simulate the various 
environments that depict the real-time AS. Stamatelatos utilized his chosen performance 
metrics in his test beds.  A brief discussion of the three test-bed networks used by him is 
as follows: 
(1) Test-Bed Network #1.  The main task of this test-bed 
network was to evaluate the performance of both the methods of remote-triggered BHR, 
i.e., destination-based and source-based. Remote-triggered BHR is reviewed in Chapter 
II. Stamatelatos simulated an AS environment with three border routers, two internal 
routers, and one trigger router.  In this test bed, malicious traffic would approach the AS 
from different sources. In addition, traffic would also traverse through different border 
routers. Once the attack began, the trigger router inside the AS was configured to 
advertise either source-based or destination-based BHR to evaluate both the techniques. 
(2) Test-Bed Network #2.  The main purpose of test-bed 
network #2 was to evaluate customer-triggered BHR and then compare its performance 
with remote-triggered BHR. He simulated this test bed by maintaining the same topology 
as discussed in test-bed network #2. The only difference was the positioning of the 
trigger router. The trigger router was placed in line with the target-host to simulate the 
customer network. 
(3) Test-Bed Network #3.  The purpose of test-bed network #3 
was to evaluate the performance of BGP BHR in a network where the routers have 
sufficient CPU capacity but some of the internal links of the victim’s network become 
congested during an attack.  He simulated this to evaluate performance when the limiting 
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factor could be the link load, not the router CPU load. He utilized five routers, one of 
which is Juniper router with a relatively high CPU capacity, to simulate this test bed. The 
topology was different from test-bed networks #1 and #2.   
2. Research Conclusions 
a. Kleffman’s Research Conclusions 
• No adverse effects due to BHR have been noticed on the normal 
operations of network like NIPRNet. 
• BHR proved to be successful in defending network like NIPRNet under 
D/DoS. 
• BHR is more effective when all the border routers of AS are participating 
in BHR. 
• Remotely-triggered BHR is more effective as compared to customer-
triggered BHR. 
b. Stamatelatos’ Research Conclusions 
• Resource overload may disrupt the BGP session between the trigger router 
and a border router and thus degrade the  performance of BGP BHR. 
• He seconded the opinion of Kleffman’s conclusion that customer-triggered 
BHR is not as effective as other techniques.  
• Destination-based BHR performed best in his test-bed simulations. 
• BHR would be totally inefficient if applied 40 seconds or more after the 
DDoS attack initialization (especially with high link load). 
E. COMMENTS 
Kleffman’s main focus was NIPRNet and his research results were based on 
simulation. The major disadvantage of simulation is that these applications are highly 
dependent on the computer configurations where they are installed. Stamatelatos 
overcame both these flaws by utilizing real-time test-beds in his research. The common 
shortcoming in both studies was the absence of IDS/IPS. Both Kleffman and 
Stamatelatos assumed in their research that a D/DoS attack has previously been 




manually added the static route to the trigger router to advertise the null route. These 
shortcomings have been overcome in this research by engaging the services of IDS and 
automating the process of null route advertisement. 
Another major shortcoming in both previous researches was in their conclusions. 
Kleffman and Stamatelatos both concluded that customer-triggered BHR is least 
effective.  
Kleffman stated7: 
Customer-triggered black hole routing is clearly not as effective as 
remote-triggered black hole routing. This is due to BGP updates being sent 
via TCP packets and the communication links between the bases and 
border routers not being of sufficient size to handle the same amount of 
traffic as the communication links between the border routers. 
On the other hand, Stamatelatos stated: 
Second, we concluded that, of the three basic BGP Blackhole routing 
methods, the customer-triggered method has the worst performance. 
Neither explored how this technique could be effective. Although the main goal 
of our research was not to investigate which BHR method was best or most effective, in 
Chapter IV, we have nevertheless discussed two methods by which the customer-
triggered method can be as effective as other techniques.  Besides, by employing the 
method we suggest in Chapter IV, Stamatelatos’ fourth conclusion, as described above, is 
nullified.   
                                                 
7 Michael D. Kleffman, “Analysis of Effects of BGP Black Hole Routing on a Network like the 
NIPRNET.” Master's Thesis, AFIT, 2005. 
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II. METHODS FOR BHR 
This chapter discusses three things. First, it discusses how the network is prepared 
for BHR. Second, it briefly touches upon the various methods available to achieve BHR. 
The final section discusses the motive for automating one of the methods. 
A. INITIAL PREPARATION FOR ACHIEVING BHR 
It is essential that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or organizations (in the case 
of customer-based BHR) have some initial preparation ready before one of the BHR 
methods is implemented to mitigate a D/DoS attack. There are four steps that need to be 
considered for this initial preparation. It is worth mentioning that these steps have no 
impact on the operation of the network. 
The first step is to set up a static route to the Null0 interface on all of the routers 
that will be triggered to implement BHR. Included in this step is the allocation of a block 
of IP address space that is not used on the Internet [RFC 1918]. For example, the IP 
address 192.168.10.0/24 was used by us in our lab. The static route added in all the 
routers appears as follows: 
ip route 192.168.10.0 255.255.255.0 Null0 
This static route indicates that any packet destined for 192.18.10.0/24 will be 
black-holed into the bit bucket. 
The second step is to set up one router or host as the trigger router or the ‘Black 
Hole Route Server' in the network. This router will be pushing out BGP blackhole route 
announcements (both addition and removal) for the victim hosts.The announcements are 
triggered when specific  static routes are added or removed on the trigger router. The 
trigger router does not have to be a dedicated router. On a Cisco router, this equates to 
redistribution edits, a route map, and some static routes with tags.8 A detailed 
configuration of a trigger router and its explanation is attached as Appendix A. 
                                                 
8 Cisco, “Remotely Triggered Black Hole Filtering—Destination Based and Source Based,” Cisco 
Press, www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/Tech/security/docs/blackhole.pdf, last accessed 9 July 2007. 
 12
The third step activates the BHR. In this step, specially tagged static routes with 
customized destination address (e.g. that of the victim) and specific next hop such as 
“192.168.10.1” are configured on the trigger router. These routes are redistributed into 
the BGP protocol and subsequently pushed into the FIBs of the BGP-speaking border 
routers. Finally, the border router start to black-hole the attack packets because of the 
combined effort of the new static routes and the preconfigured null routes. This step is 
also covered in Appendix A. 
As the final step, it is important to remove the above static routes from the trigger 
router when the D/DoS attack is over.  
B. METHODS FOR BHR 
There are two basic methods via which BHR can be achieved. These methods are 
remote-triggered BHR and customer-triggered BHR. Remote-triggered BHR is the basic 
version of BHR and can further be categorized as destination-based or source-based 
routing depending upon the IP address information used to block traffic. The following 
three sub-sections briefly discuss these three methods of BHR.  
1. Remote-Triggered Destination-Based BHR 
In remote-triggered destination-based BHR, the destination IP address which is 
under attack is advertised to be black-holed. The four steps discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter are prerequisites to achieving this technique. The following 
excerpt from a Cisco white paper nicely explains remote-triggered destination-based 
BHR.9 
The challenge is to find a way to quickly drop the offending traffic at the 
network edge, document and track the black-holed destination addresses, 
and promptly return these addresses to service once the threat disappears. 
Destination-based IP black hole filtering with remote triggering allows a 
network-wide destination-based black hole to be propagated by adding a 
simple static route to the triggering device (trigger). The trigger sends a 
routing update for the static route using iBGP to the other edge routers  
 
                                                 
9 Cisco, “Remotely Triggered Black Hole Filtering—Destination Based and Source Based,” Cisco 
Press, www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/Tech/security/docs/blackhole.pdf, last accessed 9 July 2007. 
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configured for black hole filtering. This routing update sets the next hop 
IP address to another preconfigured static route pointing to the null 
interface.  
This process is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Remote-triggered destination-based BHR.10 
The key benefit of this technique is that packets are dropped at the edge of the 
network itself and thus other traffic within the AS is not affected.  
2. Remote-Triggered Source-Based BHR 
As the name suggests, the source IP address(s) from where the attack is originated 
are advertised by trigger router to be black-holed. The four-step initial preparation, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, is mandatory. Implementation of this method is very 
similar to destination-based but it has its own pros and cons. The following excerpt from 
the Cisco documentation explains source-based BHR and discusses the advantages of this 
technique.  
                                                 
10 Cisco, “Remotely Triggered Black Hole Filtering—Destination Based and Source Based,” Cisco 
Press, www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/Tech/security/docs/blackhole.pdf, last accessed 9 July 2007. 
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Source-based BHR provides the ability to drop traffic at the network edge 
based on a specific source address or range of source addresses. The idea 
here is to drop the traffic at the edge based on the source address if the 
source of the attack can be identified. The challenge here is to find out 
whether the source is spoofed or not but on the other side the advantage is 
unlike Destination-Based BHR, entire traffic destined for target host will 
not be dropped. This kind of BHR technique would permit legitimate 
traffic from other sources to reach the target. Implementation of source-
based black hole filtering depends on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding 
(URPF), most often loose mode URPF.Loose URPF checks the packet and 
forwards it if there is a route entry for the source IP of the incoming 
packet in the router FIB. If the router does not have an FIB entry for the 
source IP address, or if the entry points to Null0, the Reverse Path 
Forwarding (RPF) check fails, and the packet is dropped. 
Figure 5 illustrates this process of remote triggered source based BHR. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Remote-Triggered Source-Based BHR.11 
The key benefit in this technique is the same as it is with destination-based 
BHR—the packets are dropped at the edge of the network. Besides, if the source is 
identified to be non-spoofed, then this technique is the most effective.  
                                                 
11 Cisco, “Remotely Triggered Black Hole Filtering—Destination Based and Source Based,” Cisco 
Press, www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/Tech/security/docs/blackhole.pdf, last accessed 9 July 2007. 
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3. Customer-Triggered BHR 
Unlike remote-triggered BHR, where the control is with the ISPs, customer-
triggered BHR is controlled by the customer of the ISP. In our scenario, the customer 
would be the military network under attack. Customer-triggered BHR takes advantage of 
the fact that the customer’s router speaks BGP to the border routers. If the network 
administrator notices that his/her network is being overloaded by a D/DoS attack, he/she 
can send an iBGP update to the border routers through his/her local router to have the 
incoming traffic dropped. As with remote-triggered black hole routing, the border routers 
would have to be configured to accept and apply the BGP route updates from the 
customer’s router.   
Customer-triggered BHR is not widely popular on the Internet because 
commercial ISPs do not like to give a customer the ability to write FIB entries at the  
ISP’s border routers. If a customer is compromised, there is a prominent threat to the 
border routers of the ISP. Still, this kind of BHR technique can bring enormous 
advantages, especially in the military networks, because it is easier to establish the trust 
relationship and pre-agreement between ISPs and military networks than with other 
settings. In this thesis, I have simulated an automation of customer-based BHR in which 
once the destination under attack is recognized, it is black-holed until the D/DoS attack is 
mitigated. Another advantage of this kind of BHR technique is that once we are sure that 
the attack is from a specific source, we can black-hole the source also. All that is required 
is to make the changes in the detector (IDS) and automate the BHR process accordingly. 
The IDS chosen in our scenario is covered in greater detail in Chapter IV. The unique 
network setup chosen to achieve customer-based BHR is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.   Lab setup simulating customer-triggered BHR. 
C. AUTOMATING BHR AND ITS ADVANTAGES 
Some of the proposed solutions have simulated the environment of D/DoS attacks 
to clients, in which, after the attack is detected, the network administrator manually 
configures a trigger router which then activates the border routers, via an iBGP update 
message, to perform null routing. In a real world scenario it is very difficult to reliably 
safeguard computer networks using this manual methodology, owing to the slow 
response cycle.  
After the automation of BHR, there should be significant improvement in the 
response time. At present, after identification of the attack, the network administrator has 
to manually add one or more static routes to the trigger router. This significantly delays 
the response time. Other disadvantages with the manual method include the network  
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administrator forgetting to configure the router, missing the receipt of an attack alert, or 
taking too much time to gain access to the trigger router. These issues can be drastically 
improved by automating the BHR process. 
Automation of BHR would facilitate much faster reaction to D/DoS attacks, thus 
further embellishing the protective effectiveness of the null routing idea that is at the 
center of the success of the BHR strategy. 
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III. SYSTEM ENGINEERING APPROACH: AUTOMATING BHR 
(METHODOLOGY FOLLOWED) 
System Engineering [Approach]: An Interdisciplinary collaborative 
approach to derive, evolve, and verify a life-balanced system solution 
which satisfies customer expectations and meets public acceptability.12 
It is stated by the International Council on System Engineering (INCOSE) that 
“System Engineering considers both the business and the technical needs of all 
customers, with the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user needs”. Any 
engineering system can have various approaches to achieve the end result. Similarly, for 
achieving this thesis’ primary objective of implementing an automated alerting process, 
this requirement can be addressed either by a top-down approach or bottom-up approach. 
With the system engineering approach, various complexities can be managed. 
A. ADDRESSABLE REQUIREMENT USING THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH 
The formal definition of the top-down approach in system engineering, as defined 
in Wikipedia, is as follows: 
In a top-down approach an overview of the system is first formulated, 
specifying but not detailing any first-level subsystems. Each subsystem is 
then refined in yet greater detail, sometimes in many additional subsystem 
levels, until the entire specification is reduced to base elements. A top-
down model is often specified with the assistance of “black boxes” that 
make it easier to manipulate. However, black boxes may fail to elucidate 
elementary mechanisms or be detailed enough to realistically validate the 
model.13 
                                                 
12 Institution of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, “IEEE P1220, Standard for Application and 
Management of the System Engineering Process,” New York, NY, 1994, p. 11. 
13 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top-down, last accessed 9 July 2007. 
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Figure 7.  Top-down approach for achieving automated alerting for BHR. 
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The top-down methodology which can be adopted in this research is enumerated 
below and illustrated in Figure 7: 
• Set up network environment to achieve BHR. 
• Set up D/DoS attack scenario to suit our goal. 
• Test the manual triggering of BHR by manually entering the static route. 
• Detect D/DoS using the IDS. 
• Achieve IDS triggering of BHR. 
B. ADDRESSABLE REQUIREMENT USING BOTTOM-UP APPROACH 
Similarly, in a bottom-up approach, every element of the system is stated 
explicitly in detail (e.g., which routers will be used to implement the BHR process). 
These elements are then linked together to form larger subsystems, which are then 
combined with other subsystems to form the final top-level system (i.e., the ultimate goal/ 
objective of the project). This strategy often resembles a “seed” model, whereby the 
beginnings are small, but eventually grow in complexity and completeness.14 In this 
project, I have used the bottom-up approach. 
The next few paragraphs will expound upon the notion of the bottom-up 
approach. The methodology employed when using this approach is as follows and is 
further illustrated in Figure 8. 
First, the hardware and software needed to simulate the identical network scenario 
had to be collected. Once this minimum requirement was met, network connection tests 
were carried out to ensure its correct operation. The components used and the IP address 
scheme followed for the tests are discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
Second, hardware and software tools were identified to create the D/DoS attack 
scenario. Once the tools were in place, the attack was tested by sending packets from the 
source to the destination machine. 
                                                 
14 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bottom-up, last accessed 9 July 2007. 
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With the network and attack scenario created, the next task was to check the 
manual triggering of the BHR and measure how quickly the trigger router could advertise 
the null route. 
Next, thorough research was carried out to find an appropriate alerting system to 
cue the trigger router alert in case of an attack. Research was conducted to find an open 
source/trial IDS that could be customized as necessary to implement the automated 
alerting.  
Once the alerter had been selected and configured, the next requirement was to 
bring the alerter into the network setup and configure the IDS to generate D/DoS alerts, 
and to ensure that the alerts were actually generated. 
Finally, the alerts generated by the alerter (IDS) were used to trigger the trigger 
router in order to complete the automation process. 
In the bottom-up approach, further complexities could be accommodated into this 
environment to suit local/organizational requirements. For example, critical alerts could 
be sent via a message/e-mail to a network administrator, or other appropriate recipients, 
in addition to the triggering router. 
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Figure 8.  Bottom-up approach for achieving automated alerting for BHR. 
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C. ANTICIPATED LIFE-CYCLE OF THIS WORK  
The research involved in this thesis is primarily intended to safeguard the network 
(more specifically, the “Autonomous System” (AS) network) on which the target host 
comes under attack. A collateral benefit of the research is that it will relieve the target 
host of the D/DoS attack traffic as well, so long as the attack traffic originated from 
outside of the host’s AS network. As long as D/DoS attacks exist, the BHR solution is an 
option for implementation by the ISP provider/customer. The technological trend in the 
network security world—as is the case in the world of traditional warfare—is that, as the 
technological upper hand is temporarily achieved by the defense, the attacker devises 
ever more complicated attacks. The crude, but effective, “route-to-null” defense 
mechanism employed by BHR is so fundamental to how traffic is controlled that this 
should always provide a high degree of network defense “triage” against what might 
otherwise be crippling D/DoS traffic volume.  
This thesis implements IP version 4, whereas the implementation of IP version 6 
in the near future is inevitable. But due to the basic behavior of packet-switched routing, 
the automated alerting of BHR would be equally effective in an IPv6 environment. So, 
the life-cycle of this project is as long as D/DoS attacks exist in the network world. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND VALIDATION 
As illustrated in the bottom-up approach in the previous chapter, this chapter 
describes  the actual implementation of the D/DoS alerting process and the tests used to 
validate the implementation. The initial sections of this chapter discuss the role of the 
alerter (IDS), and the process followed by this work in selecting the optimum alerter. 
Later sections of this chapter discuss the BGP protocol (BGP) and-more specifically-
which triggering process was employed to affect the appropriate BGP null-route update. 
The final section of the chapter discusses the network setup, the fine-tuning of the 
selected IDS, the automation of the BHR process, and, finally, the testing of the 
automated process that was developed. 
A. REMOTE (NIDS) VS. CUSTOMER (HIDS) ALERTING 
1. What is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)?  
IDSs are systems which are used to detect malicious network traffic followed by 
taking appropriate action in response.  As defined by Wikipedia:  
An Intrusion Detection System generally detects unwanted manipulations 
to computer systems.15 
These manipulations are mainly malicious activities, like unauthorized logins; 
denial of service attacks, malware (which can be in the form of viruses and worms), etc.  
There are various types of IDSs available on the market and each has its advantages and 
disadvantages, as discussed in Section B of this chapter. An IDS that is designed to 
monitor traffic for multiple hosts in the network is known as a network-based IDS 
(NIDS). Similarly, an IDS that is used to detect changes or malicious activity for one 
specific host is called a host-based IDS (HIDS). Generally, a NIDS is placed at remote 
location and can be analogized as a remote IDS. On the other hand, an HIDS is a piece of 
software which is installed on the local machine where attacks and malicious activities 
are to be detected and hence can be analogized as a local IDS.  
                                                 
15 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection_system, last accessed 9 July 2007. 
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2. Reliability of NIDS vs. HIDS 
A NIDS is generally deployed on the network/LAN, whereas a HIDS is deployed 
on a host. Both have their own pros and cons. Network security professionals working for 
large corporations or important organizations, where data protection is of utmost 
importance, face a challenge: Which is the best way to detect an attack and secure all the 
important hosts within the network. The answer to this question may never be the same in 
any given scenario. A smaller organization, which has only one kind of client operating 
system, may prefer a NIDS. On the other hand, bigger organizations, which have multiple 
operating systems installed on their network, may prefer a HIDS installed on every client 
or a NIDS installed in conjunction with the HIDS.  
A NIDS monitors every packet that is passes through the network. This is 
sometimes achieved by installing multiple sensors (receiving points) in the network. The 
various advantages and disadvantages of the NIDS are as follows: 
Advantages: 
• Very effective when used to detect the known attacks for which a 
signature is readily identifiable. 
• The NIDS runs in stealth mode and makes it hard for the attacker to know 
of its presence.16 
• The NIDS is generally not run as an “in-line” device, but rather passively 
“sniffs” a copy of all packets traversing the monitored network. Hence, a 
NIDS deployment does not adversely affect normal traffic throughout. 
• Multiple sensors can be deployed for one NIDS in large networks. 
Disadvantages: 
• In larger networks, the NIDS faces the challenge of insertion and evasion 
techniques that can be used to jumble the traffic associated with one or 
more or the protected hosts.17 
• Some less robust NIDS products have been known to crash due to an 
excessively high volume of traffic, leaving the entire network potentially 
without any intrusion monitoring protection. 
                                                 
16 Peddisetty Naga Raju, “State-of-the-Art Intrusion Detection: Technologies, Challenges and 
Evaluation,” Master’s Thesis, Linkoping, 2005. 
17 Ibid. 
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• A NIDS will be incapable of scrutinizing header and /or payload 
information in encrypted packets. 
• Placements of NIDS sensors (connection points ) is more problematic 
when working in a switched environment, as most traffic will be unicast 
vice broadcast unless the switch(es) support the configuration of a port in 
promiscuous mode 
The HIDS monitors every packet passed to the local host and the traffic is passed 
to the intended application only if there are no malicious packets. HIDS are generally 
more Operating System (OS)-specific than NIDS. Various advantages and disadvantages 
of the HIDS are as follows. 
Advantages: 
• Switch-based networks, which are an issue for NIDS, are not an issue for 
HIDS. 
• An up-to-date HIDS can protect the local host much more effectively than 
a NIDS. 
• An OS-specific attack, which may go unnoticed by a NIDS, is more likely 
to be detected by a HIDS. 
• Any malicious modification of the local machine can be more easily 
detected by the file-integrity checkers that complement a HIDS. 
• The HIDS will be able to scrutinize formerly encrypted traffic as it will 
process the received packet/payload after its receiving host has decrypted 
it.  
Disadvantages: 
• Generally, the HIDS is very difficult to manage since every host is a 
sensor on its own. 
• There is added administrator workload in maintaining one HIDS per host, 
vice very few-possibly only one-NIDS. 
• Unless the HIDS is used in conjunction with the NIDS, an attack targeting 
the entire network under attack will not likely be recognized by a HIDS. 
3. Scalability of Network 
The scalability factor plays an influential role while selecting the IDS product and 
also becomes one of the deciding factors when selecting the NIDS or the HIDS. In a 
scenario where the organization is using a pure HIDS implementation, additional budget 
resources should be allocated for new hosts.  In the case of a pure NIDS implementation, 
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the NIDS should be able to serve additional hosts. When the NIDS and HIDS are 
working in conjunction with each other, this depends on the kind of scalability (whether 
the NIDS itself will be able to serve the client or additional budget resources are required 
with the HIDS). 
B. WHICH IDS BE SELECTED FOR THIS RESEARCH? 
HIDS for complete solution and NIDS for a LAN solution. 
The above quote is attributed to Ricky Magalhaes, who authored one of the white 
papers “HIDS vs. NIDS”.18 Bearing in mind that BHR is one of the countermeasures 
against D/DoS and the consider various aspects discussed in this section, NIDS seems a 
better choice. Further, since the BHR is not a protective solution for a single, or even 
selected, host(s) in the network, but rather is a protective solution for all the hosts within 
the target’s organization/network; the network-sensing NIDS appears to be the better 
alerting tool than a single host-sensing HIDS. This strengthens our point to choose NIDS. 
Once the decision had been made that NIDS is the more suitable for our 
purposes, the next step was to identify the most favorable NIDS product to serve as the 
BHR alerter. It was surprising to note that IDSs are generally often erroneously 
understood as firewall type products and only 0.1 % of corporate networks are spending 
the required budget resources on NIDSs.19 This strengthens our argument for careful 
analysis in selecting the optimum NIDS. In our research, importance had been given to 
the following general features when we selected the optimum NIDS.  
• An NIDS which can be customized for organizational requirements. 
• Since D/DoS attacks are very sophisticated and most have new patterns, 
great importance has not been given to detecting various peculiarities or 
irregularities in the network traffic (for example, what if the attack pattern 
suddenly changes?). Instead, importance was given so that once the 
network is under D/DoS attack and the attack is detected, we can then 
automate the BHR process. Therefore, this survey was carried out to select 
the NIDS which gives the capability to write our own rules to detect the 
known D/DoS. 
                                                 
18 Ricky M. Magalhaes, “Host based vs. Network based IDS,” 
www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Hids_vs_Nids_Part1.html, last accessed 20 July 2007. 
19 Ibid. 
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• An NIDS which can integrate third-party scripts with the alerting process. 
• Software that is freely available. 
C. IDS MARKET SURVEY (WHAT’S AVAILABLE) 
Much time was spent in identifying suitable NIDSs for this research. The market 
survey was primarily based on NIDS products. Factors mentioned in Section B above 
were considered during the survey.  It was assumed that by following these factors, if we 
could successfully detect an attack and then automate the process, special NIDS software 
can always be developed to meet organizational requirements. Special NIDS software 
will have the following distinguishing characteristics: 
• Ability to detect anomaly-based attacks. 
• Ability to recognize new patterns of attacks and take suitable actions. 
• Ability to automate BHR process once the alert is generated. 
• Unusual events which do not require automation of BHR should still 
generate alerts. 
Designing special NIDS software with the attributes mentioned above (designed 
for organizational requirement) is a research project of its own. While doing a market 
survey for this project, I had concentrated on the following traits, along with the general 
features mentioned in Section B. It makes sense that if the following listed four properties 
could be achieved, then designing special IDS software with the above features would not 
only be achievable but would  also be very effective for organizational requirements. 
• The alerter should be able to recognize the specially crafted attack for this 
project. 
• It should allow us to write customized rules in order to recognize the traits 
mentioned in Step 1. 
• It should have the ability to take automated actions against crafted attacks. 
• It should perform normal actions when an attack other than the crafted 
attack is recognized. 
1. Market Survey 
A fairly large amount of commercial (with or without single-host free trial) and 
freeware NIDS products were available in the market. The idea was to select the one 
which incurs minimum cost and fulfills the maximum desired features. Benefits were 
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obtained from reviewing previous research on NIDS products [12] [13]. An additional 
market survey was carried out on at least three NIDS products by either contacting the 
marketing professionals (in the case of commercial product) or the developer (in the case 
of freeware).  
Appendix B presents the results of previously conducted research, as mentioned 
above, and presents additional information that was obtained by visiting the web site of 
the product. An additional market survey of a few more NIDS and the optimum NIDS 
selected is discussed later in this section. 
2. Signature- vs. Behavior-Based Detection 
It is worth mentioning that no IDS discussion is complete until we discuss the 
detection method of the IDS. The detection method of any IDS can be broadly 
categorized into two categories: signature-based and behavior-based detection.  
a. Signature-Based Detection 
A signature-based IDS is one that detects attacks purely on the basis of 
signatures, which are either created earlier or installed during setup and then updated 
later. This kind of NIDS is efficacious in countering  known attacks against the network. 
Known attacks can be in the form of worms, viruses, or attacks created (of known 
patterns) simply to cause a D/DoS. A famous example of a worm is the release of the 
Code Red worm in July 2001. Code Red infected nearly 360,000 servers in 14 hours in 
the second wave of attack.20 Recent examples of worms include the mass-mailing e-mail 
worm “Mydoom” that appeared in 2004. Mydoom replicated up to 1000 times per minute 
and overflowed the Internet with 100 million infected messages in 36 hours.21  “Melissa,” 
which is an example of spreading an e-mail virus, made use of a Microsoft Word macro 
embedded in an attachment. All of these highlight the importance of deploying signature-
based IDSs in general and our discussion in particular. To detect these harmful activities, 
                                                 




this kind of IDS requires a vast amount of signatures in its database. String/pattern 
matching is done with the already known patterns to identify the attack. 
b. Behavior-Based Detection  
Behavior-based detection is also called anomaly-based detection. 
According to Wikipedia: “An anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System is a system for 
detecting computer intrusions and misuse by monitoring system activity and classifying it 
as either normal or anomalous. The classification is based on heuristics or rules, rather 
than patterns or signatures, and will detect any type of misuse that falls out with normal 
system operation.”22 This kind of detection is required when organizations do not want to 
accept any deviation from normal traffic. An anomaly-based IDS raises an alarm when it 
monitors a deviation from some pre-defined “normal” baseline. 
3. Comparison (Advantages/Disadvantages) 
Advantages and disadvantages have been limited to the detection methods 
discussed in the previous section. 
Continuing the discussion on signature-based versus anomaly-based IDSs, let us 
take the scenario that the Code Red worm has just been released. When this kind of 
scenario happens, there are no existing signatures in the database which will match. This 
discussed plot outline is called the “zero-day exploit” in the computer security world. The 
inability to recognize a “zero-day exploit” is the biggest disadvantage for signature-based 
systems. Another disadvantage of signature-based systems is that even a known attack 
can be missed if its signature is missing from the database. Therefore, signature-based 
IDSs demand persistent surveillance by network administrators and the regular/routine 
updating of signatures.  
It is very evident from our above discussion that signature-based systems are less 
likely to generate false positives and negatives: there either is, or is not a match on a 
known attack signature. On the contrary, anomaly-based detection systems generate a 
                                                 
22 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anomaly-based_intrusion_detection_system, last accessed 
30 July 2007. 
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large amount of false alarms (bad) but can be very effective in the detection of zero-day 
exploits (good). Anomaly-based detectors are very helpful for the network security 
community in recognizing new patterns of attack. 
4. Detection Method for Our Research 
The basic, and most important, purpose of this project was to explore the 
effectiveness of automation of BHR and the advantages achieved from its 
implementation. Although the above factors play a vital role in the selection process, I 
was not arduous in selecting the detection method for the selected NIDS. If the alerter 
provided the capability for defining one’s own rules (for example, setting thresholds to 
detect ICMP flooding attacks) and had the capability to trigger on that rule, then that 
product was considered suitable for my purposes. 
5. Optimum Alerter Selection 
Before we conclude our discussion on which alerter we selected for our project, 
the following paragraphs discuss the additional market survey I conducted. 
a. Additional Market Survey 
In addition to the survey conducted in Appendix B, the following NIDS 
products were also surveyed: 
(1) Bro.  The Bro IDS was considered for this survey because 
it is open-source and freely available for download. As part of the survey, I posed a few 
questions to Mr. Vern Paxson, who is actively involved in the Bro research project23.  His 
answers indicated that it would be very complex to integrate Bro into our research. 
Questions asked and replies received via e-mail are attached as Appendix C. In addition, 
Bro uses a specialized policy language which would have been an additional task to 
understand. Therefore, Bro was not chosen for this project. 
 
                                                 
23 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, http://www.bro-ids.org/, last accessed 13 September 2007. 
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(2) Splunk.  Splunk is another product that is available in the 
NIDS market. Splunk, in reality, is a  search engine, which gives the flexibility to search, 
access logs and configurations, write one’s own scripts, etc. Splunk is a commercial 
product but a free download for testing for a single user is available online. 
The biggest disadvantage of this product (which made it not 
feasible for this research) is that it cannot be used as a real-time automated solution. 
Questions posed to a Splunk sales engineer brought me to the conclusion that this product 
couldnot be used for our research because Splunk would introduce a large delay in the 
triggering mechanism. Introducing an unnecessary delay would defeat the very purpose 
of automating BHR. Questions posed to the Splunk engineer are attached as Appendix D. 
b. Optimum Alerter Selected 
After a thorough survey of eight products available on the market, Snort , 
originally developed by Martin Roesch,24 was selected as undoubtedly the optimum 
alerter due to following reasons: 
• “Snort® is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection 
system utilizing a rule-driven language, which combines the benefits of 
signature, protocol and anomaly based inspection methods.”25 
• With over 3 million downloads and 100,000+ active users, Snort has 
undoubtedly become the most popular freeware IDS deployed around the 
world.26  
• Due to its wide popularity and deployment, Snort forums and communities 
often offer immediate solutions to problems encountered during 
deployment and after deployment. 
• Snort can be integrated to hundreds of third-party solutions. 





                                                 
24 Snort.org, http://www.snort.org/training/, last accessed 13 September 2007. 
25 Snort.org, http://www.snort.org, last accessed 30 July 2007. 
26 Snort.org, http://www.snort.org/community, last accessed 30 July 2007. 
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• Although Snort is highly popular due to its signature-based detection, its 
available flexibility for anomaly-based inspection methods made it very 
suitable for our research. Snort allows writing threshold-based rules, 
which presents favorable circumstances within our project to detect the 
crafted D/DoS attacks. 
D. ALERT NOTIFICATION OF TRIGGER ROUTER 
This section discusses in detail the protocol used to implement the BHR route 
update message format, which was required once the attack was recognized; automation 
techniques; and, finally, the communication channel between the alerter and the trigger 
router. 
It is good to understand the classic definition of Autonomous System (AS) before 
steering our discussion to intra-AS and inter-AS protocols. As per RFC 1268, “the classic 
definition of an Autonomous System is a set of routers under a single technical 
administration, using an interior gateway protocol and common metrics to route packets 
within the AS, and using an exterior gateway protocol to route packets to other AS's. 
From the standpoint of exterior routing, an AS can be viewed as monolithic: networks 
within an AS must maintain connectivity via intra-AS paths.”27 
1. The BGP Protocol 
Two routing protocols are used extensively for routing within an AS.  These 
protocols are Routing Information Protocol (RIP) and Open Shortest Path First (OSPF). 
RIP is a distance vector protocol which is generally implemented in smaller ASs. On the 
other hand, OSPF, which is a link-state protocol, is implemented in the larger ASs. With 
OSPF, router broadcasts route information to all other routers within their AS. Routers 
running RIP broadcasts the routing information only to neighboring within their AS. 
Once routers learn all the routes within their AS, the next task is to learn what 
exists outside their AS. This job is done by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP is 
the de facto standard for inter-AS routing protocols. BGP is generally referred as an 
exterior gateway protocol. It performs inter-AS routing by exchanging the routing 
                                                 
27 RFC 1268, www.ietf.org, last accessed 1 August 2007. 
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information between pairs of border routers serving two separate ASes. This protocol 
needs to establish a TCP connection using port 179 between the two BGP peering routers 
for exchanging BGP routing updates. 
BGP is used to learn the reachability information from neighboring ASes. BGP 
also ensures the propagation of the reachability information to the internal routers of an 
AS. BGP is a complex protocol and has an enormous number of features to implement 
policy-based decisions to ensure propagation of reachability. 
A BGP session between two BGP peers is said to be an external BGP (eBGP) 
session if the BGP peers are in different ASs. Similarly, a BGP session between two BGP 
peers is said to be an internal BGP (iBGP) session if the BGP peers are in the same AS. A 
TCP connection is required to be established in both cases. 
2. The iBGP Protocol 
iBGP works very similarly to how eBGP works. The difference lies only in how 
BGP is configured on the router and network boundaries. A primary result of this 
difference is that iBGP does not advertise outside the AS. Figure 9 represents pictorially 
the working difference between eBGP and iBGP. Figure 10 and Figure 11 as well as 
Table 1 and Table 2, portray where the difference lies while configuring the routers. 
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Figure 9.  Pictorial difference between iBGP and eBGP session. 
In the above figure, a TCP session is established between BGP peer router 1 of 
AS1 and BGP peer router 1 of AS2. Since the BGP session spans two ASes,  this TCP 
session is an eBGP session.  
The session established between router 1 and router 2 as well as between router 1 







Figure 10.  iBGP session. 
Every AS in the Internet is allotted a unique number 16-bit integer number, called 
AS number, which is used for configuring routers. This number is used for exchanging 
routing information and as an identifier of the AS itself. In our example, suppose the AS 
number of  AS 1 is 100 and 200 for AS 2. The basic configuration of iBGP and eBGP for 
the example network is shown in  Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 
 
Router 1-AS1 Router 2-AS1 
interface eth xx 
ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
    
! 
router bgp 100 




interface eth xx 
ip address 10.10.10.2 255.255.255.0 
! 
    
! 
router bgp 100 





Table 1.  Basic configuration of iBGP session between Router 1 and Router 2 of AS 
1. 
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As shown, the eBGP session in Figure 11 and the eBGP configuration in Table 2, 
note that both the routers belong to different ASs. 
 
 
Figure 11.  eBGP session. 
 
Router 1-AS1 Router 1-AS2 
 
interface eth xx 
ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.0 
 
! 
router bgp 100 
neighbor 10.10.10.2 remote-as 200 
  
 
interface eth xx 
ip address 10.10.10.2 255.255.255.0 
! 
router bgp 200 
neighbor 10.10.10.1 remote-as 100 
 
 
Table 2.  Basic configuration of eBGP session. 
E. ROUTE UPDATE MESSAGE 
Upon recognition of an attack, a major responsibility of the alerter was to connect 
to the trigger router and issue route update commands to add static routes. The IP address 
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that is to be black-holed was set for null routing. The trigger router then used the iBGP 
route update to propagate this route to all the edge routers (iBGP peers). The iBGP peers 
then set their next hop to the destination based on this update from the trigger. The route 
update command for adding a black-hole route is shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Route update message. 
A detailed explanation of this update command and trigger router configuration is 
in Appendix A. 
1. How to Achieve Automation/Scripting of Transmitted Alert  
At this stage, we know that to achieve automation, we needed to find a way to log 
into the trigger router without human (administrator) intervention. After a successful 
login process, the next major requirement was to upload the route update command (as 
shown in Figure 12) into the trigger router. 
There are many ways that this can be accomplished and the idea is to achieve this 
automation in the fastest possible way. In this section, we will discuss a few techniques 
by which automation can be achieved. The automation method chosen for our research 
will be discussed in depth when we discuss instrumentation in a late section of this 
chapter. 
A few alternative options for achieving automation for BHR are discussed below. 
Every approach has its own advantages. 
a. Plug-in 
Wikipedia defines a plug-in as “a computer program that interacts with a 
host application to provide a certain, usually very specific, function “on demand.” 




enabling third-party developers to create capabilities to extend an application, reducing 
the size of an application, and separating source code from the application because of 
incompatible software licenses.”28  
In our environment, a plug-in was one of the best options. We only needed 
the alerter to perform certain actions upon recognition of a D/DoS. A plug-in should be 
able to take care of the login process followed by updating the router with the route 
update command. A plug-in is also sometimes referred to as an add-in or add-on. When it 
comes to performance, the plug-in is faster because these are dedicated to perform very 
specific functionality.  
b. Client-Server Model  
This is another good option for achieving automation. Generally, a client-
server model can be achieved by implementing a socket mechanism. In this model, the 
server process waits for the incoming connection and the client process is the one which 
is user-driven. The server continuously listens to the requests made by clients. On receipt 
of a request from a client, a new client specific data socket is created by the server and, 
once the process is complete, the socket is closed.  
In the Unix world, implementation of client-server processes this way is 
referred as daemon processes.29 In our research, this could be implemented as follows. 
When the D/DoS attacks are recognized by the alerter, it initiates the client process. On 
the other end, the server process, which is continually listening for requests, opens the 
new socket on receipt of a request from a client process. After creating a socket, the 
server logs into the trigger router and delivers the appropriate null route update. The 
advantage of this method is that the server process can run on the same machine (i.e., on 
the alerter) or on a separate machine (in a network where IDSs have more than one 
sensor). 
                                                 
28 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plugin, last accessed 2 August 2007. 
29 University of Wolverhampton, School of Computing and IT, 
www.scit.wlv.ac.uk/~jphb/comms/sockets.html, last accessed 2 August 2007. 
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A few of the functions which are commonly invoked to achieve the 
purpose are shown in Table 3.   
 
socket() To create a socket  
bind() To associate a socket with a network address  
connect() To connect a socket to a remote network address  
listen() To wait for incoming connection attempts  
accept() To accept incoming connection attempts  
Table 3.  Common functions of socket programming.30 
c. Search and Destroy   
This technique can also be employed to achieve our aim of automation. 
Most of the IDSs maintain their alert database when the rules are fired on the basis of 
signature detection, anomaly-based detection, or protocol-based detection. In this 
technique, the scheme is to search the pattern for which BHR automation is supposed to 
be triggered. Once the pattern is found in the database, a third-party script can be run to 
log into the router and deliver the null route update command. For example, we could log 
the alerts in the SQL database. Then, whenever a new alert is generated, the database is 
searched and, if the matching pattern is found, a Java script program can be used to log 
into the trigger router to deliver the route update command. The Java script may invoke 
another third-party script. For example, the “Expect”31 software package offers scripts 
which automate the remote login into other devices by mechanizing telnet, etc. 
                                                 
30 University of Wolverhampton, School of Computing and IT, 
www.scit.wlv.ac.uk/~jphb/comms/sockets.html, last accessed 2 August 2007. 
31 The Expect Home Page, http://expect.nist.gov/, last accessed 13 September 2007. 
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The biggest disadvantage of this technique is delay. Searching might 
require a long time to match the pattern, especially in a scenario where the alerter is 
already overwhelmed with an enormous amount of packets during D/DoS attacks. 
2. Alerter-to-Trigger-Router Channel 
This section discusses the communication channel adopted to achieve the 
automated triggering process. It basically depends on the network setup. Irrespective of 
anything else, the alerter is always going to be in the local network. If a customer-based 
BHR is planned, then the alerter and trigger router are going to be placed in the same 
network.  Direct Ethernet connectivity is the best option. In case, the trigger router is 
placed at the ISP level; then the communication channel can be agreed upon between the 
organization and the ISP. The main concern will be security. The automated login should 
be secured, e.g., SSH (secure shell) should be preferred over telnet because SSH is a 
network protocol which allows data transfer over a network in a secure fashion. 
In our scenario, since we had implemented customer-based BHR, the alerter as 
well as the trigger router are co-located and thus telnet session is less of a risk than if the 
traffic was traveling outside the alerter’s network. 
3. Advertisement Channel 
Once the D/DoS attack against the target host is ascertained; how quickly the 
attack can be halted within the autonomous boundary depends on how fast the trigger 
router can advertise a black-hole route. The advertisement channel is the communication 
channel used by the trigger router to advertise new route information to border routers.   
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Figure 13.  Dedicated channel used for advertisement. 
During D/DoS attacks, the existing route from the border routers to the victim 
machine is already overwhelmed with an enormous amount of packets. In such 
circumstances, it may be difficult to propagate new routing information through the same 
channel from where the D/DoS occurred. There are a couple of ways this issue can be 
resolved; either by having a dedicated channel to the ISP, e.g., modem connectivity, or by 




Figure 14.  Advertisement by reserved bandwidth (effective when the attack is 
coming via the same route). 
It is essential to prioritize this channel. Using a dedicated channel achieves the 
BHR automation fastest because this methodology uses a channel which is not affected 
by the D/DoS attack. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that adopting this method by 
every customer/organization is not feasible due to the following: 
• ISPs cannot provide the direct access to their routers. 
• Procuring dedicated channels presents additional cost to any organization. 
In our research we used a dedicated channel (Ethernet connection) to one of the 
border routers to advertise the new route. This simulates the scenario in which there was 
an agreement for the customer to have access to the ISP’s border router.  
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F. TEST NETWORK CONFIGURATION 
This section describes, the most critical part of the research, including the 
hardware and software requirements for the test network, the topology and  IP routing 
scheme used, and fine tuning of the selected alerter. Most of the time was spent in 
configuring the network (routers, switches, etc.), selecting and fine tuning the alerter 
(Snort), and configuring and modifying a third-party Snort plug-in for automating the 
BHR. 
1. Main Components and Their Configuration  
The list of components used (along with the software used) selected for our 
topology are mentioned below. Later in the section, the configuration for each component 
is also discussed. 
a. Hardware and Software  
The following devices were used for our test bed network: 
• One Cisco router with IOS C2600 software, Version 12.1(14), with five 10 
Mbps Ethernet Interfaces, used as an internal router. 
• One Cisco router with IOS C2600 software, Version 12.1(13), with five 10 
Mbps Ethernet Interfaces, used as an internal router. 
• One Cisco router with IOS C2600 software, Version 12.0(14), with five 10 
Mbps Ethernet Interfaces, used as a trigger router. 
• Two Cisco routers with IOS 3600 software, Version 12.2(3) with four 10 
Mbps Ethernet Interfaces and one 100 Mbps Fast Ethernet Interface.These 
routers were used as Border Routers. 
• Two Cisco 1900 16-port switches in the port-forwarding mode. 
•  Two desktop PCs with Windows XP SP 2. One was used as a target 
machine and the other was used as an attack monitor. The attack monitor 
was placed outside the AS boundary. 
• One desktop PC with Fedora 6.0 loaded on it for the IDS. 
• One Smart Bits 6000C Performance Analysis System of Spirent 




• One LAN-3321A TeraMetrics XD module with two 10/100/1000 Mbps 
Ethernet Copper ports and two 1 Gigabit Ethernet Fiber ports installed on 
the Smart Bits 6000C system. Both the copper ports were used to simulate 
a D/DoS attack. 
The applications used for our research were as follows: 
• Smart Window version 7.70.128, for use with the Smart Bits 6000C 
system. 
• CommView version 5.5 of Tamosoft, for crafting custom packets. 
• Ethereal version 0.10.7 (C) running with WinPcap (3.0 alpha3) for 
capturing traffic.  
• Wireshark version 0.99.3a Network Protocol Analyzer with libpcap 
version 0.9.4 on Linux 2.6.18-1.2798.fc6. 
Arrangement of all the constituent elements of the network as well as the 




Figure 15.  Detailed network setup with IP scheme. 
b. Routers (Border, Internal, Trigger) 
As shown in Figure 15, five routers were utilized to form the test bed. Two 
routers were configured as border routers to simulate the AS environment. Interfaces of 
the border routers which are facing the internal routers are configured with the OSPF 
protocol. Two internal routers were configured with only the OSPF protocol to simulate 
the environment of the network within the AS. Sample configurations of the border 
routers and internal routers are provided in Appendices E and F, respectively. 
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c. Target 
For the sake of simplicity, one Windows XP machine was selected as a 
target machine. The IP address 10.0.4.2 was assigned to this Windows XP machine, as 
shown in Figure 15. Ethereal was loaded onto this machine to capture the packets and to 
note the efficacy of the D/DoS attack. Further, to see the effect of D/DoS attacks, 
network utilization was also monitored, which is discussed in next section. 
d. Alerter (IDS) 
This was the most important and critical component of the network setup. 
After selecting the optimum alerter, as discussed in Section B of this chapter, setting up 
and fine tuning this crucial element of the network, took most of the allotted time. 
Snort version 2.6.1 software was downloaded from the official Snort site.  
Sourcefire reference manuals were very helpful in setting up the alerter as per our 
environment.32 33 Snort was installed on Fedora 6.0. Snort software versions are also 
available for Windows, Solaris, etc. Research revealed that Snort is most stable with a 
Linux-based environment. The following are the step-by-step details followed for setting 
up Snort. 
2. Setup of Snort 
There are various ways Snort can be installed: by downloading the RPM directly 
or from the source code. The approach I followed was a mixed approach. Along with 
installing Snort, a graphical interface called BASE was also installed. BASE was 
installed in order to verify Snort’s capability as an “attack recognizer” and an “alert 
notifier” once an attack was recognized.  
a. Step 1 
Before performing Snort installation, we needed to perform some basic 
network settings and configure the services we needed to run. During our setup, the 
                                                 
32 Sourcefire, “Building and Operating Snort,” Security Training Program, 2004-2007. 
33 Sourcefire, “Snort Rules,” Security Training Program, 2004-2007. 
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firewall was turned off for simplicity. The firewall can be part of a hardening exercise 
once the automation was achieved. While configuring the network, the following should 
be configured without any ambiguity: 
(1) IP Address.  Two IP addresses were allocated to alerter. 
One IP address was configured for Ethernet which sniffs the traffic for network 
10.0.4.0/24. This IP address need not belong to a specific network because this interface 
runs in promiscuous mode. As shown in Figure 15, the other interface is part of the  
10.0.5.0/24 network. Therefore, IP address 10.0.5.2 was allocated to the other Ethernet 
port, which was connected to the trigger router.  
(2) Netmask.  A network mask of 255.255.255.0(/24) was 
used. 
(3) Gateway.  Although in our scenario it was not mandatory, it 
is a good practice to provide a default gateway address. 
(4) DNS Server.  In our scenario, we did not configured a DNS 
server. 
(5) Services.  Ports 22, 80, 443, and 3306 were enabled to 
support  SSH, HTTP SSL and MySQL services in the Fedora box. If the MySQL package 
is not installed in Fedora, then the following packages need to be installed from the 
Fedora 6.0 CD or by downloading the RPMs from the Internet. In order to achieve a 







b. Step 2 
Before installing Snort, several components were required to be pre-
installed. The following components were downloaded from the Internet as source code 




The packages above allowed using Snort rules, tearing down TCP sessions 
in response to an alert, and putting the interfaces into promiscuous mode to read network 
traffic off the wire. 
These packages were extracted and complied in the /usr/local directory 
by giving the following commands in sequence for every package: 





The first step shown above extracted the PCRE package. The second step changed 
the /usr/local to the /usr/local/pcre-6.3 directory. Steps three through five compiled the 
PCRE package. A similar process was followed for LIBNET and LIBCAP packages. 
c. Step 3 
At this stage, we installed the Snort and configured the MySQL database 
to configure the Snort alerts. This step also included; creating a few directories that  
would be used by Snort. 
                                                 
34 SoureForge, Inc., http://sourceforge.net/, last accessed 3 September 2007. 
35 tcpdump/libpcap, http://www.tcpdump.org/release/, last accessed 3 September 2007. 
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Snort version 2.6.1 was downloaded into /usr/local/src directory. The file 
name of the Snort package is snort-2.6.1.3.tar.gz. This file was extracted and compiled as 
follows. 
tar zxvf src/snort/snort-2.6.1.3.tar.gz 
cd snort-2.6.1.3 
./configure   - -with –mysql 
make all 
make install 
The series of commands listed above successfully installed Snort in the 
Fedora machine. The third command indicated that Snort was compiled with MySQL.  
Snort’s official website also provided the up-to-date rules, which were 
downloaded into the /usr/local/src directory and copied into newly created directories of 
Snort as follows. 
mkdir  /etc/snort 
mkdir /var/log/snort 
tar zxvf /usr/localsrc/snortrules-snapshot-Current.tar.gz –C /etc/snort 
cp etc/*.conf*   /etc/snort 
cp etc/*.map     /etc/snort 
ln –s    /usr/local/bin/bin/snort  /usr/sbin/snort 
The six commands above were given in the /usr/local/snort-2.6.1.3 
directory. The following three commands created a Snort user and user group in Snort 
directory. 
groupadd snort 
useradd  -g snort  snort 
chown snort:snort  /var/log/snort 
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At this stage, a few configuration changes were required in order to get 
Snort up and running. Configuration changes were made in a file called snort.conf, which 
existed within the /etc/snort/snort-2.6.1.3 directory. We edited this file with the vi  vi 
editor by giving the following command. 
vi  /etc/snort/snort.conf 
Once the file is opened, string  “ var RULE_PATH” was searched. Make 
the modification to the variable as follows: 
var  RULE_PATH   /etc/snort/rules 
After making the above modification, we searched for the following string 
“database: log to variety of databases” and then added the following line at a point 
directly after the commented lines. 
output database:  log, mysql,  user=snort   password=password dbname=snort  
host=localhost 
The line above tells  Snort to log the events in the MySQL database. Snort 
was also provided with the details of the database. The database name was “snort”, the 
user name was also “snort”, and the password was “password”.  
At this point, Snort was installed but, in order to check the working of 
snort, we needed to  create the database named “snort” in MySQL. To achieve this, issue 
the following statements: 
mysql 
SET PASSWORD FOR root@localhost=PASSWORD(‘password’); 
create database snort; 
grant CREATE, INSERT, SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE on snort.* to 
snort@localhost; 
SET PASSWORD FOR snort@localhost=PASSWORD(‘password’) 
exit 
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The above statements created a database named snort, in which Snort 
would log its events. The Snort package also contained the schema for various databases. 
These schemas were located in the snort-2.6.1.3 directory. The following commands 
activated the database schema. 
/usr/local/snort-2.6.1.3/schemas 
mysql –p < create_mysql snort 
At this stage, the database called snort was created, which can be tested by 
giving the following commands: 
mysql –p  
(Enter password, which is “password” as per our configuration.) 
SHOW DATABASES; 
Now, we could test the Snort installation by giving the following 
command: 
/usr/local/bin/snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
The Snort process created the alert file under /var/log/snort/ on its own. 
We needed to change the permissions of the alert file so that the Snort user could access 
that file. This was achieved by giving the following commands. 
chown snort: snort   /var/log/snort/alert 
chmod 600 /var/log/snort/alert 
d. Step 4 
In this step, we installed BASE and ADODB packages. The ADODB 
package provided the interface between the GUI and the MySQL database. The BASE 
package provided the graphical front end to the Snort database. These packages were 
downloaded from sourceforge into the /usr/local/src directory.36 These packages helped 
                                                 
36 SoureForge, Inc., http://sourceforge.net/ last accessed 5 September 2007. 
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in viewing alerts in an organized fashion. These were installed to ensure the proper 
functioning of Snort and its customized Snort rule. 
cd  /var/www/html 
tar zxvf /usr/local/src/adodb490.tgz 
tar  zxvf /usr/local/src/base-1.2.7.tar.gz 
chown apache base-1.2.7 
service httpd restart 
Now, since we restarted the http service, we configured the BASE by 
opening the browser. We opened the browser with URL http://localhost/base-1.2.7.  
It was a fairly simple process. Once the above URL was typed, the BASE 
setup program started on its own. It prompted for the path to ADODB in the first step. 
The path name was given as /var/www/html/adodb. The next step was to enter the 
database name, database host, database user name, and database password. Enter those 
details exactly as configured in Step 3 of this section.  We submitted the query by 
clicking “the submit query” button on the screen. We followed the on-screen instructions 
in the setup script to create the database tables used by the BASE application. Clicking 
the “Create BASE AG” button created tables. Now, the login screen was presented. Upon 




Figure 16.  Screen shot of successful BASE setup. 
The following commands were given to enable the BASE graphing 
capability. Prior to executing the following commands, we installed the php-peat-1.4.9-
4.noach.rpm and php-gp-5.1.6-3.i380.rpm packages.  
pear install Image_Color 
pear install Log 
pear install Numbers_Roman 
pear install http://pear.php.net/get/Numbers_Words-0.13.1.tgz 
pear install http://pear.php.net/get/Image_Graph-0.3.0dev4.tgz 
 56
e. Step 5 
In this step, we wrote our own customized rule and tested the rule by 
simulating a D/DoS attack. Snort allows users to write their own rules as per 
organizational requirements. By default, all the Snort rules were found in /etc/snort/rules 
directory. The rules folder contained a file named “local.rules” through which the user 
could add customized rules. We added the following rule to this file. 
alert icmp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: “ICMP Denial of 
Service Test”; itype 8; classtype: misc-activity; threshold: type both, track by_dst, 
count 100, seconds 10; sid: 1000001; rev: 1 ;) 
The above rule was written in the /etc/snort/rules/local.rules file. The 
detailed explanation of this rule is attached as Appendix G. After writing the rule into 
Snort, the following command was executed for the custom rule to take effect. 
service snortd restart 
f. Step 6 
The next step was to test the custom rule. We simulated a  D/DoS attack 
scenario. At this point, we will not discuss creating an attack scenario as that will be 
covered in the next sub-section. Rather, we would assume that the attack against the 
target host has commenced. The following screen shot of BASE shows that the custom 
rule took effect immediately. 
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Figure 17.  Successful activation of custom rule. 
The above screenshot indicates clearly that the “ICMP Denial Of Service 
Test” custom rule fired successfully. The destination address indicates that the victim 
machine was 10.0.4.2 and the source address indicates that the origin of attack was 
10.0.20.1. The timestamp indicates that the threshold settings worked as desired. After 
recognizing more than 100 packets of type “ICMP echo request”, the first rule fired at 
15:09:37, then again at 15:09:48, again at 15:09:59, and so on. This proves that the 
threshold settings of the rule worked successfully for the D/DoS attack under 
consideration.   
 58
3. Instrumentation 
a. Packet Capture 
To monitor the packets at various locations in the network, Ethereal 
version 0.10.7 (C) and Wireshark version 0.99.3a Network Protocol Analyzer tools were 
used. Ethereal was installed on the desktop PCs running Windows XP (the attack 
monitoring machine and the target machine, as shown in Figure 15). Wireshark was 
installed on the Fedora machine. 
b. System Logs/Files 
Log files while setting up Snort were constantly monitored to troubleshoot 
the various problems faced during installation. To automate the BHR, we did not use the 
log files because we did not follow the search-and-destroy technique as discussed earlier.  
c. Traffic Generator 
To craft the ICMP packets used for the attack, CommView version 5.5 of 
Tamosoft and Ethereal version 0.10.7 (C) were used. Once the desired ICMP packets 
were crafted, the Smart Bits 6000C system, with LAN-3321A TeraMetrics XD module 
with two 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Copper ports, was used to simulate the D/DoS 
attack. The in-depth explanation of this entire process is discussed in Appendix H.  
d. Automation Achieved via Plug-in 
An important aspect of intrusion detection is not only registering events, 
but also reacting to the attack attempts. Mitigating D/DoS by automating BHR is one of 
the reactive techniques.  
As discussed previously, there are various approaches to achieve 
automation. Snort provides the capability to analyze data and take action based on the 
results. Techniques used to take action can be writing one’s own custom script, using an 
available plug-in, writing one’s own plug-in, etc. Snort has tools like Swatch to automate 
the responses of Snort alerts. Swatch is a “Simple log Watcher,” which monitors log files 
for specific triggers and, when any of the triggers are matched, it performs a certain 
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action, for example, sending the route update message, sending an e-mail to system 
administrators about the event, etc.37 Swatch is one approach to achieving automation. 
Another approach is the plug-in, which can be one of the best investments. Due to the 
evolution in the software field in the recent past, before writing an output plug-in, we 
must explore all the possibilities to find the suitable plug-in to achieve our goal. 
After thorough research, it was found that a Snort has been extended with 
an output plug-in that notifies the SnortSam agent of blocking requests on a rule basis. 
SnortSam, developed by Mr. Frank Knobe (www.snortsam.net) is an intelligent agent 
that allows Snort to block connections by configuring firewalls or routers. SnortSam 
requires the Snort rule to be modified. The biggest advantage of this SnortSam agent is 
that it is built on the client-agent-based concept. SnortSam runs as an independent 
process and does not increase the workload of Snort. 
To achieve the automation of BHR, the following four steps were 
followed: 
e. Install SnortSam  
Excellent help was available at www.snortsam.net to install and configure 
the module. The SnortSam module was installed as guided by the official site.38 After 
installing the SnortSam module, the snortsam.conf file, which is located under the 
/usr/local/snortsam/conf directory, was configured with following options. 
accept 10.0.4.3/24 
accept localhost 
 logfile   /var/log/snortsam.log 
daemon 
cisconullroute 10.0.5.1  password  password 
                                                 
37 Brian Caswell, Jay Beale, James C. Foster, “Snort 2.0 Intrusion Detection,” Syngress, 2003, p. 304. 
38 SnortSam, http://www.snortsam.net/files/snortsam/docs/INSTALL, 5 September 2007. 
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The above configuration tells the SnortSam client to accept the 
connections from the local host as well as 10.0.4.3 (one of the interfaces of the alerter). 
The logfile option tells it where to log files, and, finally, “cisconullroute 10.0.5.1 
password “password” tells it to use the cisconullroute plug-in. 10.0.5.1 is the address of 
the router where the SnortSam module will log into. The first “password” was the login 
password for the telnet session and the second “password” was the password to enter the 
configuration mode of the Cisco router. 
f. Reconfigure the /etc/snort/snort.conf File 
Once SnortSam was running and listening, we needed to configure Snort 
in two places. First, we needed to add the output plug-in so that Snort could send the 
block request of the destination IP address. The following command was written in the 
snort.conf file. 
output alert_fwsam:  127.0.0.1 
That command told Snort to send the blocking request to the local 
machine. The IP address 127.0.0.1 was configured because the SnortSam module was 
configured on the same machine where Snort was configured.  
The second place where Snort required configuration was the rule (we 
wrote earlier) which was going to use the SnortSam module. This is discussed in next 
step. 
g. Modify the Custom Rule 
Now, since the output plug-in was configured, we were required to 
configure the Snort rules that should invoke a blocking of the destination IP address on 
the Cisco router. We added the “fwsam:” statement in the rule. The custom rule which we 
discussed in detail in Appendix G was modified as follows: 
alert icmp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: “ICMP Denial of 
Service Test”; itype 8; classtype: misc-activity; threshold: type both, track by_dst, 
count 100, seconds 10; sid: 1000001; rev: 1 ; fwsam: dst, 20 minutes;) 
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The option “fwsam: dst, 20 minutes;” added in the rule body told Snort to 
invoke a block of 20 minutes on the destination address via the SnortSam module 
whenever the above rule fired. 
After modifying the snort.conf files, we gave the following command to 
restart Snort. 
service snortd restart 
h. Modify the “ssp_cisco_nullroute.c” C File  
The modified file is attached as Appendix I. This code does following 
three things 
• It logs on the trigger router via telnet. 
• It issues a command to enter the “null-route”. 
• Finally, when the time interval of blocking expires, it removes the added 
route. 
Although, the userid and password information for the telnet session is 
provided as discussed earlier and blocking information is provided in modified rule but 
the special tag value used in AS to advertise the null-route needs to be configured in this 
C file. Once the original code’s logic was understood, the modification was quite 
straightforward by adding sprintf statement. After modifying the code, the entire 
snortsam module needs to be rebuilt otherwise the modification will not take effect. The 
instructions for this process are available at the snortsam site39. It is worthwhile to 
mention, at present, this module supports only telnet sessions. In the future, this code can 
be rewritten in the same fashion to support the SSH protocol.  
G. TESTING 
In our research, network components were built gradually and tested at every 
stage, as shown in Figure 8. In the first stage, after configuring the routers and creating 
the attack scenario in the network, manual triggering was tested. After successful manual 
triggering, the optimum alerter was selected and fine-tuned to our requirements. A 
                                                 
39 SnortSam, http://www.snortsam.net/files/snortsam/docs/INSTALL , last accessed 13 September 
2007. 
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custom rule was made and tested on the alerter. A SnortSam module was installed on the 
alerter. A SnortSam plug-in was configured and its C file was modified to achieve 
automation of the BHR. To test the automation, a unique matrix was developed, which is 
shown as follows in tabular form. We will represent the results of each phase as screen 
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Table 4.  Tabular matrix to test the automation of BHR. 
Table 4 shows how the test bed network performed during the D/DoS. It has three 
phases: attack is underway but not yet recognized, attack is recognized by Snort, and after 
the recognition of attack. Throughout the testing, the network setup as delineated in 
Figure 15 remained the same. Explanation of these three phases is as follows: 
1. During the Attack 
A D/DoS attack was activated from the Smart Bit 6000C system. The source of 
the attack was simulated from two machines with IP addresses 10.0.10.1 and 10.0.20.1. 
The copper ports of the LAN card of the Smart Bit 6000C systems were configured with 
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these source addresses. When the attack started, the packets were immediately captured 
by Ethereal running on the attack monitoring machine. Figure 18 shows the captured 
packets from source IP address 10.0.20.1. As depicted in Figure 15, the attack monitoring 
machine was placed in network 10.0.20.0/24, therefore, packets from source 10.0.20.1 
could only be captured at this machine. Hence, the screenshot displayed packets captured 
from IP address 10.0.20.1 only.  
 
 
Figure 18.  Packets captured at attack monitoring machine (10.0.20.3). 
Packets were also captured at the target machine. Figure 19 below shows the 
captured packets from both sources (10.0.10.1 and 10.0.20.1). Figure 20 shows the abrupt 
change in the network utilization card of the target machine, which pictorially represent 
the effects of the D/DoS attack on the target/victim machine. 
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Figure 19.  Packets captured at the target machine (10.0.4.2). 
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Figure 20.  Network card utilization at target machine. 
Packets captured by Wireshark in the Fedora machine, where the NIDS was 
installed, are shown in Figure 21. The IDS detected the continuous flow of packets of 
type “ICMP Echo Request”. Since this sensor was placed at the entry point of the LAN 
(10.0.4.0/24) in promiscuous mode, both the source IP addresses were detected. 
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Figure 21.  Packets captured by the Fedora box (10.0.4.3). 
During the practical demonstration, it was noticed that internal routers were 
flooded with packets. The LED marked as “activity” on the front panel of the Cisco 2600 
routers (shown as internal router 1 and internal router 2 in Figure 15) started to blink 
rapidly. This was a positive indication that both the routers were flooded with an 
enormous amount of traffic. 
Route statistics were observed during the attack at the border router as well as at 
the trigger router. To display the current state of the routing table, Cisco routers were 
issued  the “show ip route” command. The following is the sample output from this 
command, showing the current routing table in the trigger router. 
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Trigger-Router#show ip route 
 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2, * - candidate default 
       U - per-user static route, o - ODR 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
 
S    192.168.10.0/24 is directly connected, Null0 
     10.0.0.0/24 is subnetted, 3 subnets 
C       10.0.8.0 is directly connected, Ethernet1/3 
C       10.0.5.0 is directly connected, Ethernet1/1 
B       10.0.100.0 [200/0] via 10.0.8.2, 00:00:08  
Similarly, the following is the sample output displayed by one of the border 
routers when “show ip route” command was entered in the border router: 
Border_Router_1#show ip route 
 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2, ia - IS-IS inter area 
       * - candidate default, U - per-user static route, o - ODR 
       P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
 
S    192.168.10.0/24 is directly connected, Null0 
     10.0.0.0/24 is subnetted, 8 subnets 
C       10.0.10.0 is directly connected, Ethernet0/2 
O E2    10.0.8.0 [110/20] via 10.0.100.2, 00:27:27, Ethernet0/0 
O       10.0.2.0 [110/20] via 10.0.100.2, 00:27:27, Ethernet0/0 
                 [110/20] via 10.0.1.2, 00:27:27, Ethernet0/1 
O       10.0.3.0 [110/20] via 10.0.1.2, 00:27:27, Ethernet0/1 
C       10.0.1.0 is directly connected, Ethernet0/1 
O       10.0.4.0 [110/30] via 10.0.1.2, 00:27:27, Ethernet0/1 
O E2    10.0.20.0 [110/20] via 10.0.100.2, 00:27:28, Ethernet0/0 




2. When the Attack is Recognized 
During the attack recognition phase, the analysis machine and the victim machine 
continued to receive “ICMP echo request” packets, as shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19, 
respectively. Internal routers were still overwhelmed with an enormous amount of traffic. 
The configurations of the trigger and border routers remained unchanged. 
The difference noticed in this phase was that once the attack was recognized by 
the alerter, the alerter fires the custom rule and starts the telnet session with the trigger 
router. Figure 22 pictorially represents the packets captured by Wireshark in the telnet 
session between the alerter (10.0.5.2) and the trigger router (10.0.5.1).  
First, a three-way handshake was performed for the telnet session. Then, the 
alerter passes the authentication information in order to update the route information for 




Figure 22.  Telnet session between alerter and trigger router. 
3. After the Attack is Recognized 
This phase described the changes in the network environment once the telnet 
session between the alerter and the trigger router was complete. This phase also illustrates 
the fruitful results of the automation process.  
Ethereal, running on the attack monitoring box, which was connected outside the 
AS boundary, continued to capture packets, as shown in Figure 23. This clearly indicates 
that the Smart Bit System was continuously sending the “ICMP echo request” packets, 
which ensures that the D/DoS attack was still active.  
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Figure 23.  Packets captured at the attack monitoring box. 
At the end of the telnet session, a new route update message, as discussed in 
Section C and shown in Figure 12, was passed by the alerter to the trigger router as telnet 




Figure 24.  Route update message passed by the alerter to the trigger router. 
Once the route update message is passed, the configuration of the trigger router 
got updated. The following was the sample output of the “show ip route” command, 
showing the updated routing table in the trigger router: 
Trigger-Router#show ip route 
 
10w3d: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by vty0 (10.0.5.2) 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
i - IS-IS, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2, * - candidate default 
U - per-user static route, o - ODR 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
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S    192.168.10.0/24 is directly connected, Null0 
10.0.0.0/8 is variably subnetted, 4 subnets, 2 masks 
C       10.0.8.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet1/3 
S       10.0.4.2/32 is directly connected, Null0 
C       10.0.5.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet1/1 
B       10.0.100.0/24 [200/0] via 10.0.100.1, 00:00:55 
Trigger-Router# 
There are two noticeable things in the above sample output. First, it states that it 
was configured from console by vty0 (10.0.5.2), which means the configuration of the 
trigger router got updated by telnet session from IP address 10.0.5.2. IP address 10.0.5.2 
is the address of the alerter. Second, it shows “S   10.0.4.2/32 is directly connected, 
Null0”, which means there is a static route of IP address 10.0.4.2 to Null0 interface. 
On getting this new static route information, the trigger router started the iBGP 
session with the border router and advertised the new route information. A sample output 
from the “show ip route” command, showing the current routing table in the border router 
is as follows: 
Border_Router_1#show ip route 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2, ia - IS-IS inter area 
       * - candidate default, U - per-user static route, o - ODR 
       P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
 
S    192.168.10.0/24 is directly connected, Null0 
     10.0.0.0/8 is variably subnetted, 9 subnets, 2 masks 
C       10.0.10.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet0/2 
O E2    10.0.8.0/24 [110/20] via 10.0.100.2, 00:02:57, Ethernet0/0 
O       10.0.2.0/24 [110/20] via 10.0.100.2, 00:02:57, Ethernet0/0 
                    [110/20] via 10.0.1.2, 00:02:57, Ethernet0/1 
O       10.0.3.0/24 [110/20] via 10.0.1.2, 00:02:57, Ethernet0/1 
C       10.0.1.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet0/1 
B       10.0.4.2/32 [200/0] via 192.168.10.2, 00:02:33 
O       10.0.4.0/24 [110/30] via 10.0.1.2, 00:02:59, Ethernet0/1 
O E2    10.0.20.0/24 [110/20] via 10.0.100.2, 00:02:59, Ethernet0/0 




It was very evident in the sample output of the border router that a new static 
route to 10.0.4.2. was  added via BGP protocol. Now, since the border routers were 
advertised with this latest route information, any D/DoS attempt against the victim 
machine (10.0.4.2) would be mitigated. Also, during a practical demonstration, it was 
noticed that activity at the internal routers returned to normal. Figure 25 indicates that 
Ethereal running on the victim machine stopped capturing “ICMP echo request” packets, 
which means that the D/DoS attack against the target machine was mitigated and the 
automated BHR process was successful. 
 
Figure 25.  D/DoS attack against the target (10.0.4.2) was mitigated. 
 74
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 75
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter IV demonstrated the real-time execution of the BHR automation process. 
It was noted that once an attack was detected the system close to 20 seconds to mitigate 
the D/DoS attack. This time includes the telnet/SSH session initiated from the IDS to the 
trigger router, advertisement of the null route to all the border routers, and dropping all 
the malicious packets at the AS boundary. In addition, the test-bed setup was monitored 
constantly for a period of four months and several live demonstrations were given to 
important visitors from the National Security Agency and other organizations. The test-
bed setup was always found to be robust. No events like the IDS crashing due to 
application failure or excessive D/DoS traffic were noticed. The IDS never required any 
restarts. This leads us to the conclusion that the automation of BHR is not only an 
adaptable and useful technique, but it is also an efficacious and productive technique to 
mitigate the D/DoS attacks.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Though BHR cannot be the sole solution to mitigate a D/DoS attack, it is 
recommended that the BHR solution should be one of the mechanisms available to 
safeguard the target(s) and network resources from annoying D/DoS traffic within an AS.  
To achieve this, organizations should implement an IDS-as-BHR-alerter solution that can 
be customized as per local  policy. 
BHR proves to be one of the fastest ways to mitigate D/DoS attacks on the 
network. As mentioned in the conclusion, it took close to 20 seconds to mitigate a D/DoS 
attack. Therefore, it is recommended that if customer-triggered BHR is to be 
implemented as an enterprise-level security solution, then a continuous SSH session 
should be maintained between the customer’s IDS and the trigger router. This will 
significantly decrease the time needed to mitigate the D/DoS attacks (i.e., there will not 
be any time wasted establishing the SSH session).  
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It is also recommended that progressive steps should be initiated to have pre-
agreements with ISPs in order to effectively defend networks via customer-triggered 
BHR. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
While this research proves that automating BHR brings substantial advantages, 
there are additional opportunities to produce better results. As said by Buddha in one of 
his inspirational quotes.40  
All that we are is the result of what we have thought. 
We also believe that the thought process should never end. Continuing on this 
note, we recommend that the following future studies would be very beneficial for the 
network security field in general and mitigation of D/DoS attacks in particular.  
As discussed in Chapter IV, reserving some bandwidth in the “in-band” route path 
could be very productive  for a customer/alerter to advertise the null route, rather than 
necessitating a dedicated link between customer/alerter and trigger router. Evaluating the 
performance of customer-triggered BHR by adopting this technique could yield some 
interesting results.  
In this research, we used the open-source IDS Snort, which is not specially 
designed to mitigate D/DoS attacks. One area of future research would be develop a set 
of Snort rules that are specific to D/DoS attacks and sufficiently general to detect most of 
the known types of D/DoS attack, and, and additionally, new forms of attacks. 
It may also be  worthwhile to develop a smarter IDS that can be customized to 
trigger the source-based as well as the destination-based BHR as per policy. The 
following are a few examples of the characteristics which a smarter IDS might have: 
 
 
                                                 
40 About, Inc., http://quotations.about.com/od/inspirationquotes/tp/10_inspiration.htm,last accessed 5 
September 2007. 
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• If it is certain that the source IP address(es) from where the D/DoS attack 
originated is/are not spoofed, there should be no hesitation to block 
this/these source IP address(es). 
• On the other hand, if it is certain that the D/DoS attack is against a host or 
server that is not offering any services outside the AS, then blocking the 
destination IP address is a better option.  
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service timestamps debug uptime 
service timestamps log uptime 










 no ip unreachables 
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 
 ip address 20.0.0.1 255.255.255.0 
 no ip directed-broadcast 
! 
interface Ethernet1/0 
 no ip address 




 ip address 10.0.5.1 255.255.255.0 
 no ip directed-broadcast 
! 
interface Ethernet1/2 
 no ip address 





 ip address 10.0.8.1 255.255.255.0 
 no ip directed-broadcast 
! 
router bgp 209 
 no synchronization 
 network 10.0.8.0 mask 255.255.255.0 
 redistribute static route-map StaticToBGP 
 neighbor 10.0.8.2 remote-as 209 
 neighbor 10.0.100.1 remote-as 209 
 no auto-summary 
! 
ip classless 
ip route 192.168.10.0 255.255.255.0 Null0 
! 
route-map Static permit 10 
! 
route-map StaticToBGP permit 10 
 match tag 20 
 set ip next-hop 192.168.10.2 
 set local-preference 200 
 set origin igp 
 set community no-export 
! 
! 
line con 0 
 password password 
 login 
 transport input none 
line aux 0 
 password password 
 login 
line vty 0 4 




no scheduler allocate 
end 
B. DETAILED EXPLANATION 
The above configuration can be explained with following figure. 
 
Figure 9.  Target machine 10.0.4.2 under attack and trigger router sending new 
updates after having been informed by alerter. 
In our scenario, the trigger router uses the next hop method and sets the next hop 
route for the destination IP address that is to be black-holed and then uses iBGP route 
update to propagate this route to all the edge routers (iBGP peers). The iBGP peers then 
set their next hop to the destination based on this update from the trigger. On every edge 
router, there is a static route for this next hop set to null0.41 Upon receiving a route 
update for the destination IP, both the border routers in our scenario set their next hops 
accordingly. The static route for the next hop effectively forwards all traffic for the black-
holed destination IP address to null0. The trigger router has forwarded the next hop IP 
                                                 
41 Cisco, “Remotely Triggered Black Hole Filtering—Destination Based And Source Based,” Cisco 
Press, www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/Tech/security/docs/blackhole.pdf, last accessed 9 July 2007. 
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address as 192.168.10.2. Now, since the border routers have already been configured at 
the ISP with 192.168.10.0/24 set to Null 0, therefore, all the traffic destined towards the 
target machine will now be dropped at the border routers. The following sequence of 
events will occur when the target is under attack. 
1.  An attack is targeted at 10.0.4.2. 
2.  A static route to the target IP address, 10.0.4.21, is added to the triggering 
router with the tag 20. 
3.  A route map in the trigger matches the tag 20 and sets the next hop to 
192.168.10.2, origin to IGP, and community to no-export. Community no-
export tells that this route should not be forwarded outside the autonomous 
system boundary. 
4.  The trigger sends the route as an iBGP route update to both the border 
routers. 
5.  The border routers that are peers receive the update and accordingly set 
the next hop to the target, 10.0.4.2, as 192.168.10.2. 
6.  Since the border routers have static routes of 192.168.10.0/24 set to null0, 
the final FIB entry for the target IP address (10.0.4.2) is set to null0. 
7.  All future traffic to 10.0.4.2 will be forwarded to null0 and dropped. 
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No This is not the 
feature which 
is desired by 
this project but 
this is the 
feature which 
is desired for 
D/DoS attack 
recognition. 
                                                 
42 Ricky M. Magalhaes, “Host based vs. Network based IDS,” 
http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Hids_vs_Nids_Part1.html,last accessed 20 July 2007. 
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APPENDIX C.  INTERACTION WITH ACTIVE RESEARCHER OF 
BRO 
Question 1: Is Bro capable of detecting most of the DoS/DDoS attacks? 
Reply by Bro researcher: It has a module for detecting SYN flooding, and another that 
performs general analysis of large bursts of traffic (but which hasn't been integrated into 
the rest of the system in terms of producing events upon detection). 
Question 2: If not, can it be tuned to do so? 
Reply: Well, its analysis is all scriptable, so you can make it do a wide range of detection. 
But if by “tuned” you mean there's a couple of settings that you adjust and that's it, then 
no, it requires scripting. 
Question 3: If yes, is there any good source to learn the Bro language (e.g., a book, 
such as Bro for Beginners or Learning Bro). 
Reply: Just the documentation that comes with it and is available from the wiki. 
Question 4: Is Bro compatible with other scripts written in Python, Java, or Perl? 
Reply: It can call arbitrary programs but doesn't link directly into other interpreters. 
Question 5: Can Bro talk to Cisco routers? If yes, can Bro also talk to Juniper 
routers? 
Reply: It does so, again, via calling arbitrary programs. The one we use for dynamic 
blocking, then ‘SSH-es’ into the LBL border router. 
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APPENDIX D.  INTERACTION WITH REPRESENTATIVE OF 
SPLUNK 
Question 1: In our scenario and environment we want to integrate your product 
for detecting a known DDoS attack and, after detection of a particular attack, 
whether Splunk can handle the following: Is your product capable of talking to a 
Cisco router when desired to modify the running configuration of Cisco (available 
via plug-in or something along these lines). I can put forth further questions once I 
am clear that this functionality is performed by Splunk. 
Reply by Splunk Representative, Mr. Michael Wilde, Sales Engineering Manager: Puri, 
provided you are testing Splunk 2.2 (although 3.0 is in beta now), there's a feature called 
“LiveSplunk” (in 3.0, it’s just called “a scheduled save search and alert”). You can run a 
script when results from a scheduled search have passed a threshold, for example, 
“number of events rises by N” triggers a script that ‘SSH-es’ into the Cisco router and 
makes a configuration change. While Splunk doesn't have a plug-in to modify the Cisco 
configuration, there's no reason why it can't trigger another mechanism. 
 Question 2: I think, Michael, you understood the requirement. We can run the 
script and it will be supported by Splunk. Now, the queries related to the earlier 
question are: 
(A) Does Splunk have an auto feature which triggers the script (like snort) 
or do we need to have a separate module tied up with the alarms of 
Splunk? 
(B) Is the daemon that listens to certain events provided by Splunk or do 
we need to write that daemon? 
(C) What kind of scripts does Spunk support…and are Python and C part 
of them or not? 
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Reply: Puri, the answers to all of your questions are, primarily Splunk supports scripts 
that execute on the local operating system and are wired up for action by automated 
searches in the alerting (or LiveSplunk) mechanism at a minimum of one-minute 
intervals. 




APPENDIX E.  CONFIGURATION OF BORDER ROUTER 
! 
version 12.2 
service timestamps debug uptime 
service timestamps log uptime 













 no ip unreachables 
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 


















 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
router ospf 109 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 redistribute connected subnets 
 redistribute static subnets 
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 redistribute bgp 209 subnets 
 network 10.0.1.0 0.0.0.255 area 0 
 network 10.0.100.0 0.0.0.255 area 0 
! 
router bgp 209 
 no synchronization 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 network 10.0.100.0 mask 255.255.255.0 
 neighbor 10.0.8.1 remote-as 209 
 neighbor 10.0.100.2 remote-as 209 
 no auto-summary 
! 
ip classless 
ip route 192.168.10.0 255.255.255.0 Null0 














line con 0 
 password password 
 login 
line aux 0 
 password password 
 login 
line vty 0 4 






APPENDIX F.  CONFIGURATION OF INTERNAL ROUTER 
! 
version 12.1 
no service single-slot-reload-enable 
service timestamps debug uptime 
service timestamps log uptime 









ip address 10.0.3.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Ethernet1/0 
ip address 10.0.1.2 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Ethernet1/1 








no ip address 
shutdown 
! 
router ospf 109 
log-adjacency-changes 
network 10.0.1.0 0.0.0.255 area 0 
network 10.0.2.0 0.0.0.255 area 0 
network 10.0.3.0 0.0.0.255 area 0 
! 
ip classless 
no ip http server 
! 
! 
line con 0 
password password 
login 
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APPENDIX G.  DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE 
CUSTOMIZED RULE 
The customized rule that was written to detect “ICMP flooding” D/DoS attacks is 
detailed in the following steps. This rule is written in /etc/snort/rules/local.rules. 
alert icmp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: “ICMP Denial of 
Service Test”; itype 8; classtype: misc-activity; threshold: type both, track by_dst, 
count 100, seconds 10; sid: 1000001; rev: 1 ;) 
The rule is a specified set of keywords and arguments used  as matching criteria 
to identify security policy violations, known network attacks, etc.43 Depending on the 
action specified in the rule, it may alert, log, ignore the packet, trigger an alert, and 
perform customized actions. The rule contains two logical sections: the rule header and 
the rule body. The rule header contains the rule’s action, protocol, source IP address, etc. 
The rule body contains the keywords and arguments. In our customized rule, the rule 
header contains following information: 
alert icmp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any 
(a) In our case, the rule’s action is to alert. Alert means to log the event and 
send an alert message to the output component. 
(b) Each rule requires that we must specify the protocol. In our case, we have 
specified ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol). 
(c) $EXTERNAL_NET means any traffic coming from any host that is not on 
our internal network. 
(d) “any” means any traffic coming from any port on the originating host. 
(e) Æ is the operator. 
(f) $HOME_NET means any traffic meant for a host belonging to our internal 
network. 
(g) “any” means any traffic destined for any port to destination. 
                                                 
43 Sourcefire. “Building and Operating Snort.” Security training program, 2004-2007, Sourcefire. 
 98
Snort does not actually require that there be a rule body because all the basic 
information is already contained in the rule header.44 However, the rule body is the 
portion which has real power. The rule body allows Snort to drill into a packet. The entire 
rule body is enclosed in parentheses. Every rule option ends with a semicolon (even the 
last option). In our customized rule, the rule body contains the following information: 
(msg: “ICMP Denial of Service Test”; itype 8; classtype: misc-activity; threshold: 
type both, track by_dst, count 100, seconds 10; sid: 1000001; rev: 1 ;) 
(a) “msg” allows us to give the appropriate name to customized rule. The alert 
will include the message “ICMP Denial of Service Test.” 
(b) “itype 8’ tells Snort to look for ICMP packets of the echo request type. 
(c) The “classtype” is miscellaneous. 
(d) We have tuned the Snort for a threshold. This option contains following 
information 
 “threshold: type both, track by dst, count 100, seconds 10”  
(i) “type both” means to alert every M times we see this event 
during the time interval, then ignore events for the rest of 
the time interval. 
(ii) “track by_dst” tells Snort to track the event occurring as per 
destination address. 
(iii) “count 100” and “seconds 10” means that this rule will look 
for a minimum of 100 ICMP echo request packets within 
10 seconds before generating an alert and then ignore the 
rest of the packets. For example, if there are 20,000 packets 
of this kind within the mentioned time duration, Snort will 
generate the alert on the 100th packet and will ignore the 
rest of the packets. Snort will start to look for this pattern 
again after the mentioned duration of 10 seconds expires. 
                                                 
44 Sourcefire. “Building and Operating Snort.” Security training program, 2004-2007, Sourcefire. 
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(e) The “sid” option is used to set the Snort ID to appear with the alert when 
the rule triggers. For custom rules, we must use a number greater than 
1,000,000 to distinguish them from the rules released by Snort. In our 
case, since this is the only custom rule we have in Snort, a sid value of 
1000001 is used. 
(f) The “rev” option helps to manage rules. This option allows us to assign a 
revision number once a rule is edited. In our case, revision number 1 was 
used. 
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APPENDIX H.  CREATION OF ATTACK ENVIRONMENT 
A ping attack occurs when an attacker attempts to overwhelm the victim’s 
equipment through the use of ICMP echo request packets. Like most D/DoS attacks, ping 
attacks attempt to use CPU cycles and memory to prevent legitimate use of equipment.  
The purpose of this research is to prove that the target host is partially saved from 
D/DoS attack once the attack pattern is recognized. The saving is “partial”; as the BHR 
solution takes the rather drastic action of dropping all traffic from sources outside of the 
target host’s autonomous systems (AS); thereby alleviating the target host of the 
excessive traffic, but also rendering it incommunicado with any legitimate traffic source. 
Further, BHR will be ineffectual against any D/DoS traffic originating from within target 
host’s AS. ICMP echo request packets were crafted to simulate the ping attack scenario. 
To craft the genuine looking ICMP echo request packet of IP ver. 4.0 we need to have a 
good understanding of the following: 
(a) Various fields of IP ver. 4 Header. 
(b) Various fields of ICMP ver. 4 Header 
(c) Various fields of ICMP ver. 4 echo request Header. 
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Figure 10.  IP version 4 header45 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Type Code Header Checksum Header Checksum 









                                                 
45 IETF Secretariat, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt, last accessed 10 September 2007. 
46 Internet FAQ Archives, http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc792.html,last accessed 10 September 2007. 
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Figure 12.  ICMP v4 Echo Request Header47. 
Creating the packet not only requires a network packet generator tool but also a 
packet capture utility, like Wireshark or Ethereal, to verify the correct checksum. Then, 
the hex codes of successfully crafted packets were fed into Spirent Communication’s 
Smart Bit Generator. The step-by-step methodology followed to craft packets is as 
follows:  
1. Downloaded the following tools: 
(a) Ethereal (or Wireshark) to check the correct checksum. 
(b) CommView Ver 5.5 (Evaluate Version)  
2. The tool CommView Version 5.5, (evaluation version) of tamosoft was 
used to craft ICMP packets. The combination of this tool and the packet monitoring tool, 
Ethereal, helped me to create genuine-looking ICMP packets in the lab. The first step was 
to enter the destination and source MAC address (remember, the destination MAC 
address is the next hop address). The following figure shows that the moment we entered 
the new source and destination, the IP address tool showed the checksum as incorrect.   
                                                 
47 Internet FAQ Archives, http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc792.html,last accessed 10 September 2007. 
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Figure 13.  Snapshot of Comm View. 
3. Still, we let the packet go with the wrong checksum and monitored the 
packet contents through Ethereal to check for the correct checksum. The following figure 
shows that Ethereal captured the packet and, not only displayed the incorrect checksum, 
but also suggested what the correct checksum should be. This correct checksum was then 
fed into NetComm to retransmit the packet. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Snapshot of Ethereal. 
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4. After feeding the correct header checksum, a packet was loaded with some 
data. This time NetComm showed the ICMP checksum to be incorrect. The same 
technique discussed in Steps 2 and 3 were followed to find the correct checksum. The 
following figures portray the detection of incorrect ICMP. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Snapshot of Comm View. 




Figure 16.  Snapshot of Ethereal. 
6. Finally, we had a genuine-looking packet. Once we sent this crafted 
packet, as shown as follows, we could monitor via Ethereal that there were no more 




Figure 17.  Snapshot of successful packet sent via Comm View. 
7. CommView had another feature by which we could set the transmission 
rate of crafted packets. To create the D/DoS scenario, we could have three machines 
simply running this tool and generating the packets at a rate of 2000 packets per second.  
8. Since we had the Smart Bit Chassis (manufactured by Spirent 
Communication) available in the lab, we utilized that equipment. The following few 
paragraphs describe how we configured the equipment.  
This equipment is very effective. Various network-related measurements 
were carried out.  
The hex code of the crafted packet was fed into Spirent Communication’s 
Smart Bit Generator to activate the attack. We fed different source MAC 
addresses although changing the MAC address would not change the IP 
header checksum. Still, the ICMP checksum would vary because the 
Smart Bit generator had a limit on the length of contents we could feed. 
Applying the same technique, we sent the packet from the Smart Bit 
generator with a bad ICMP checksum and found the correct one through 
Ethereal. 
9.  The following few paragraphs provide step-by-step instructions on how to 
set a customized packet in Smart Bit generator. 
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(a) The Smart Bit chassis should be connected to the PC from where we are 
about to configure. Install the Smart Bit application software onto the PC.  
(b) After the installation of Smart Bit applications, launch SmartWindow by 
selecting Select Start > Programs > SmartBits SystemsApplications > 
SmartWindow. We shall see the following window. 
 
     
Figure 18.  Snapshot of initial SmartWindow. 
(c) When we select SMB-6000 followed by connect, SmartWindow will try to 
connect to the chassis but may not connect because we have yet to assign 
the IP address to our PC (ensure the physical connectivity). Also, we may 
not be able to view the cards connected to the Smart Bit generator. For 
that, we need to assign the PC an IP address belonging to the same 
network as the Smart Bit chassis. The default address of the Smart Bit 
chassis is 192.168.0.100 (/24). Therefore, we can give any address 
belonging to this network range. After assigning the IP address, we shall 
be able to ping the 192.168.0.100.  Now, again click on SMB 6000, then 
select connect, followed by the trivial details asked by the application. 
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Then, you should be able to see the sample figure showing the LAN 
3321A card connected to the Smart Bit generator. 
 
Figure 19.  Snapshot of SmartWindow after successful connection to Smart Bit chasis. 
(d) Every LAN card consists of two ports. We can go to any port and right-
click, then select the Transmit setup since we are going to set up the 
transmission of packets from these cards. Enable the smart metric mode as 




Figure 20. Snapshot of transmit setup via SmartWindow. 
(e) From the above figure, select the edit button and enter the custom editor, 
where we can feed the customized packet. A successfully delivered crafted 
packet through Smart Bit is shown in the next figure. Testing of this 
packet was already done by Comm View and Ethereal. This packet was 
used from port 01 of a LAN card. The other port can be used to transmit 
the same kind of packet by doing little bit of modification. 
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Figure 21. Snapshot of customized packet sent through Smart Bit. 
10. Since, in our scenario, the attack is from two places to simulate the D/DoS 
attack, we have used both the ports of the LAN 3321A card. 
11. During this process, we discovered an IOS vulnerability—due to which, 
we had to create more genuine-looking packets. The Smart Bit generator had the built-in 
capability to generate the ICMP packet but, when those packets were sent as attack 
packets, the Cisco device receiving these specifically crafted IPv4 packets will force the 
inbound interface to stop processing traffic. The device may stop processing packets 
destined to the router, including routing protocol packets and ARP packets. No alarms 
will be triggered, nor will the router reload to correct itself. This issue can affect all Cisco 
devices running Cisco IOS software. This vulnerability was noticed when packets left the 
source machine successfully but did not reach the destination. While investigating, it was 
found via the  show interface ethernet 0/0 command in Cisco router, that the input 
queue size was more than the output queue. Additional investigation led us to believe that 
all the packets were dropped by the Cisco interface. This was verified by giving the  
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command show buffers input-interface serial 0/0 packet, which indicated  millions of 
packets dropped. Further research showed that this vulnerability is present in all devices 
running Cisco IOS released before July 2003.   
 113
APPENDIX I.  SSP_CISCO_NULLROUTE.C 
The following is the modified source code for the Cisco null route plug-in. We 
must take this opportunity to thank Mr. Frank Knobbe for developing a great plug-in. His 
thorough research saved us precious time in not having to reinvent the wheel. 
/* $Id: ssp_cisco_nullroute.c,v 2.2 2005/07/10 21:08:34 fknobbe Exp $ 
 * 
 * 
 * Copyright (c) 2005 Frank Knobbe <frank@knobbe.us> 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 
* Acknowledgements: 
 * 
 * Brent Erickson and Sergio Salazar for the idea and sample commands. 
 * 
 * 
 * ssp_cisco_nullroute.c  
 *  
 * Purpose:   
 * 
 * This SnortSam plugin telnet's into one or more Cisco routers and issues 
 * a route command to effectively “null-route” the intruding IP address. 






#ifndef  __SSP_CISCO_NULLROUTE_C__ 

















/* This routine parses the cisconullroute statements in the config file. 
 * It builds a list of routers) 
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*/ 
void CiscoNullRouteParse(char *val,char *file,unsigned long line,DATALIST 
*plugindatalist) 
{ CISCONULLROUTEDATA *ciscop; 
 char *p2,msg[STRBUFSIZE+2],*p3; 
 struct in_addr routerip; 
 
#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 




 { p2=val; 
  while(*p2 && !myisspace(*p2)) 
   p2++; 
  if(*p2) 
   *p2++ =0; 
  routerip.s_addr=getip(val); 




 /* create new router */ 
   plugindatalist->data=ciscop; 
   ciscop->ip.s_addr=routerip.s_addr; 
   ciscop->username[0]=ciscop->enablepw[0]=ciscop-
>userlogin=0; 
   ciscop->telnetpw=ciscop->username; 
 
   if(*p2) 
   { val=p2; 
    while(*val && myisspace(*val)) /* now parse the 
remaining text */ 
     val++; 
    if(val) 
    { p2=val; 
     while(*p2 && !myisspace(*p2)) 
      p2++; 
     if(*p2) 
      *p2++ =0; 
     safecopy(ciscop->username,val); /* save 
telnet password */ 
 
     p3=strchr(ciscop->username,'/');  /* Check if 
a username is given */ 
     if(p3) 
     { *p3++ =0; 
      ciscop->telnetpw=p3; 
      ciscop->userlogin=TRUE; 
     } 
      
     if(*p2)      
   /* if we have a second password */ 
     { while(*p2 && myisspace(*p2)) 
       p2++; 
      safecopy(ciscop->enablepw,p2);/* it 
would be the enable password */ 
     } 
     else 
      safecopy(ciscop->enablepw,ciscop-
>telnetpw); /* if only one password was found, use it for both */ 
    } 
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   } 
   if(!ciscop->telnetpw[0]) 
   { snprintf(msg,sizeof(msg)-1,”Error: [%s: %lu] Cisco 
Router defined without passwords!”,file,line); 
    logmessage(1,msg,”cisconullroute”,0); 
    free(ciscop); 
    plugindatalist->data=NULL; 
   } 
#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 
   else 
    printf(“Debug: [cisconullroute] Adding Cisco Router: 
IP \”%s\”, PW \”%s\”, EN \”%s\”\n”,inettoa(ciscop->ip.s_addr),ciscop-
>telnetpw,ciscop->enablepw); 
#endif 
  } 
  else 
  { snprintf(msg,sizeof(msg)-1,”Error: [%s: %lu] Invalid 
CiscoNullRoute parameter '%s' ignored.”,file,line,val); 
   logmessage(1,msg,”cisconullroute”,0); 
  } 
 } 
 else 
 { snprintf(msg,sizeof(msg)-1,”Error: [%s: %lu] Empty CiscoNullRoute 
parameter.”,file,line); 





/* This routine initiates the block. It walks the list of routers 
 * telnet's in, and issues the route command. 
 */ 
void CiscoNullRouteBlock(BLOCKINFO *bd,void *data) 
{   CISCONULLROUTEDATA *ciscop; 
 struct sockaddr_in thissocketaddr,routersocketaddr; 
 SOCKET routersocket; 
 unsigned long flag; 
 char cnrmsg[STRBUFSIZE+1],cnrat[STRBUFSIZE+1]; 
#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 
#ifdef WIN32 
 unsigned long threadid=GetCurrentThreadId(); 
#else 





  return; 
    ciscop=(CISCONULLROUTEDATA *)data; 
 
#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 




 snprintf(cnrat,sizeof(cnrat)-1,”router at %s”,inettoa(ciscop-
>ip.s_addr)); 
  









 /* create socket */ 
 routersocket=socket(PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP);  
 if(routersocket==INVALID_SOCKET) 
 { snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,”Error: [cisconullroute] Couldn't 
create socket!”); 
  logmessage(1,cnrmsg,”cisconullroute”,ciscop->ip.s_addr); 
  return; 
 } 
 /* bind it */ 
 if(bind(routersocket,(struct sockaddr *)&(thissocketaddr),sizeof(struct 
sockaddr))) 
 { snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,”Error: [cisconullroute] Couldn't 
bind socket!”); 
  logmessage(1,cnrmsg,”ciscocnullroute”,ciscop->ip.s_addr); 
  return; 
 } 
 /* and connect to router */ 
 if(connect(routersocket,(struct sockaddr 
*)&routersocketaddr,sizeof(struct sockaddr)))  
 { snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,”Error: [cisconullroute] Could 
not connect to %s! Will try later.”,cnrat); 
  logmessage(1,cnrmsg,”cisconullroute”,ciscop->ip.s_addr); 
 } 
 else 
 { do 
  { 
#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 
   printf(“Debug: [cisconullroute][%lx] Connected to 
%s.\n”,(unsigned long)threadid,cnrat); 
#endif 
   flag=-1; 
   ioctlsocket(routersocket,FIONBIO,&flag); /* set non 
blocking  */ 
 
   if(ciscop->userlogin) 
   {
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,”“,”username”,”waiting for user logon prompt from “,cnrat)) 
     continue; 
    snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,”%s\r”,ciscop-
>username); /* Send username password */ 
 
   
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,cnrmsg,”pass”,”at password prompt from “,cnrat)) 
     continue; 
    snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,”%s\r”,ciscop-
>telnetpw); /* Send telnet password */ 
   } 
   else 
   {
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,”“,”pass”,”waiting for logon prompt from “,cnrat)) 
     continue; 
    snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,”%s\r”,ciscop-
>telnetpw); /* Send telnet password */ 





>ip,cnrmsg,”>“,”at logon prompt of “,cnrat)) 
    continue; 
     
   /* Send enable */       
          
  
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,”enable\r”,”pass”,”at enable command of “,cnrat)) 
    continue; 
 
   /* Send enable password */ 
   snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,”%s\r”,ciscop->enablepw);  
  
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,cnrmsg,”#”,”at enable prompt of “,cnrat)) 
    continue; 
 
   /* Send config */ 
  
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,”config t\r”,”#”,”at config command of “,cnrat)) 
    continue; 
 
   /* send route command */ 
   snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,”%sip route %s 
255.255.255.255 null 0 tag 20\r”,bd->block?”“:”no “,inettoa(bd->blockip)); 
  
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,cnrmsg,”#”,”at route command of “,cnrat)) 
    continue; 
 
   /* End input */ 
  
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,”\032”,”#”,”at CTRL-Z of “,cnrat)) 
    continue; 
 
   /* Save config */ 
  
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,”write mem\r”,”#”,”at write mem command of “,cnrat)) 
    continue; 
 
   /* and we're outta here... */ 
  
 if(!sendreceive(routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,”cisconullroute”,ciscop-
>ip,”quit\r”,”“,”at quit command of “,cnrat)) 
    continue; 
 





#endif /* __SSP_CISCO_NULLROUTE_C__ */ 
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